I am happy to share with the readers the recent publication of my chapter “On the Road to Substantive Equality: Due Process and Non-discrimination at San José,” written for the book When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint, by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour (Oxford University Press 2015). Continue reading
Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, a case recently decided at Strasbourg, concerned incidents arising from a demonstration by followers of “Ataka,” a political party known for its views against Islam and its adherents. The place of the demonstration: in front of the Banya Bashi Mosque in Sofia. The time: during Friday prayers. The manner: carrying flags featuring slogans such as “Let’s get Bulgaria back;” shouting insults at the worshippers such as “Turkish stooges”, “filthy terrorists,” “scum” and “Your feet stink! That is why you wash them!;” pelting them with eggs and stones; cutting a Turkish fez with a pocket knife while saying “Can you hear me? We shall now show you what will happen to each one of you!” and setting fire to prayer rugs.
The Court declared the Article 3 complaint, either alone or in conjunction with Article 14, inadmissible but found a violation of Article 9. In this post, I offer some preliminary thoughts on the inability of the Article 9 analysis to make visible what the events were really about at their heart.
Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) published on 24 February 2015, backed the investigative methods of four Swiss journalists who had used hidden cameras to expose the malpractice of insurance brokers. The ECtHR found by a majority decision that the journalists’ criminal conviction by the domestic courts and an order to pay a number of small fines violated their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. It was the first time the ECtHR examined the use of hidden cameras by journalists in a case where the person filmed was targeted as a representative of a particular profession rather than in a personal capacity.
This guest post was written by Ingrid Leijten, Ph.D. researcher and lecturer at the Leiden University Faculty of Law, Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law. See also the post she wrote for Verfassungsblog.
Over the years, the Court’s social security case law has not become much easier to understand. Meanwhile, the Court has rendered numerous judgments on a great variety of social benefits, pensions, etc., yet it is not always clear where it draws the line between ‘property’ and ‘mere hope’ to obtain a benefit (of a certain height), or between a reasonable and a disproportional interference with someone’s acquired social security rights. The social security case law of the Court remains vulnerable to criticism, not least also because of the tension inherent in the protection of ‘social’ interests under a document that is primarily ‘civil and political’ in kind.
In the recent case of Béláné Nagy v. Hungary the dissenters contend that the Court recognizes a right to obtain social security benefits under Article 1 P1, and hold that this is incompatible with this article’s object and purpose. Although it was decided by a three to four vote and hence might be referred to the Grand Chamber, the diverging conclusions of the majority and the minority make it worth discussing this case as an illuminative example of the complexity of the protection of social security interests qua property rights. After outlining the issue at stake and the findings of the Court, I will present the valid concerns of the dissenters, to argue that no matter how difficult this may be, it would be important for the Court to adopt a more transparent approach.
This guest post was written by Paul Harvey, a UK lawyer in the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights. This article is an edited version of a paper given at the European University Institute, Florence on 28 January 2015. The views expressed are personal. Comments are welcome at paulgharvey[at]gmail.com.
What constitutes an effective third party intervention before the European Court of Human Rights? Before answering that, it is necessary to make three preliminary points on what distinguishes the practice of the Strasbourg Court on third party interventions from other courts.
First, the Court has always had a comparatively liberal policy as regards granting leave to third party interveners. Second, since the third party interventions of Amnesty International and the German Government in Soering v. the United Kingdom in 1989, there have been well over a hundred significant interventions in Court’s cases. The Court has generally been well served by these interventions, though for reasons I shall come to, in some cases it has been less well served in recent years. Third, a survey of those interventions shows a striking range in both the types of interveners and the types of cases in which they have intervened. There have been broadly six types. Continue reading
This guest post was written by Salvo Nicolosi, Postdoctoral Researcher at Ghent University’s Human Rights Centre.
The recent decision in A.M.E. v. The Netherlands, issued by the European Court of Human Rights last 13 January 2015 and notified in writing on 5 February 2015, offers another occasion to assess through a human rights perspective the working of the Dublin system for determining which State is responsible for deciding an asylum seeker’s application for international protection.
Based on Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 (now replaced by Dublin III Regulation 604/2013) such system has represented the core of a thriving case law of the Strasbourg Court, including the case under discussion. The analysis will be therefore enhanced by discussing the findings in other two key cases to which the Strasbourg made explicit reference in A.M.E. v. The Netherlands, namely the recent Tarakhel v. Switzerland and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. Continue reading
With an impressive 1,000 votes cast, the time has come to announce the winners and losers of this year’s poll on the best and worst ECtHR judgment of 2014.
We will not let the audience linger in anxious anticipation, but will get straight down to the nitty-gritty. Here are the results:
Best Judgment – Top 3
- Matúz v. Hungary (47%).
- Tarakhel v. Switzerland (29%).
- Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania (15%).
Worst Judgment – Top 3
- S.A.S. v. France (40%).
- Senchishak v. Finland (36%).
- M.E. v. Sweden and Pentikäinen v. Finland (6%).
Festive congratulations to the winner, sincere commiserations to the loser.
A few – speculative – words follow on why the winner might have won, and why the loser might have lost.