When criminal offences are committed out of hate towards people with a particular skin color, gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc; this hate component is often considered to be an aggravating factor leading to a higher penalization of the crime. The primary victims of these hate crimes are the people who actually possess one those characteristics. Hate however often extends to people who do not have any connections with these characteristics, but who are perceived as belonging to a group having these characteristics. An example is Sikhs who are perceived as Muslims and as a consequence have been victim to islamophobia. A third group of potential victims of hate crimes are people who are associated or affiliated with others who actually or presumably possess (one of) these characteristics. This could for example be through family ties, friendship, membership to some organisations etc. In the case of Skorjanec v. Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights is confronted with this last category of hate crimes This case concerns in particular a possible racist hate crime by association. Continue reading
Author: Saïla Ouald Chaib
European Court of Justice keeps the door to religious discrimination in the private workplace opened. The European Court of Human Rights could close it.
By Saïla Ouald-Chaib and Valeska David
On 14 March 2017, the European Court of Justice issued two judgments, in the cases of Achbita and Bougnaoui concerning the manifestation of beliefs in the private workplace. From the perspective of inclusion and human rights law, the judgments are very disappointing. They basically legitimize and even provide a recipe for discrimination of employees on the basis of their religious or other convictions. Continue reading
ECJ headscarf series (6): The vicious circle of prejudices against Muslim women
By Saïla Ouald Chaib
The day the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the case of Achbita v. G4S came out, my phone did not stop ringing. The press wanted to know if this opinion really meant that employers could refuse to hire women wearing a hijab. The fact that even journalists sounded surprised speaks for itself. Friends and organizations called me to know my view as a lawyer about this development in the case-law. “How can this be justified from a human rights perspective?” “What can we do to stop this?” And also: “how will I ever find a job if even a European Court backs this kind of discrimination?” These are only a few of the questions I received.
There are many aspects of these opinions that I would like to discuss. However, in light of the previous blog posts in this series, in which a technical legal analysis has already been undertaken from different angles, I will, within the limits of a short post, focus on one particular aspect, namely the perspective of the applicants and with them that of many other Muslim women, in particular in Belgium where the facts of the case of Achbita took place and where our Human Rights Centre is also based. Indeed, in complement to a strictly legal debate, it is important to understand the situation on the ground. This post should therefore be read as a companion piece to the previous post in this series written by Eva Brems, in which she gave an overview of the limiting regulations affecting Muslim women in Belgium.
Research methodology for case law analysis: An appeal for openness
By Saïla Ouald Chaib
The enrolment as a PhD student does not come with a handbook. Consequently, you are somewhat forced from the start to reflect not only about the research subject, but also on the methodology you will use. In my case indeed, I spent some time not only doing research on the substantive part of my dissertation topic, but also doing research on doing research. My dissertation focused on the right to freedom of religion in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and case law analysis occupied therefore a central position in my work. Very soon I was confronted with a lot of questions. Do I first dive into the literature on the subject or do I first analyse the case law? Which cases should I read and how many? How should I approach the case law? This blogpost does not intend to draw a roadmap of how to conduct case law analysis. In fact, there is no such thing as one case-law analysis method. Instead, I want to share one of the ways I analysed the case-law and how methodologies from outside the legal sciences inspired me in the process. Continue reading
Religious signs in public schools: Belgian Council of State shows judicial bravery
Co-authored by Yousra Benfquih* and Saïla Ouald Chaib**
As in many other countries in Europe, the wearing of religious signs has been the topic of heated debate in Belgium. This has been the case for public servants, teachers, employees in private firms and the wearing of religious signs by pupils in school. It is the latter issue that was the subject of two recent judgments of the Belgian Council of State (Conseil d’Etat, Belgium’s highest administrative court), judgments that might prove to mark a watershed in the Belgian discourse on headscarf bans, freedom of religion and the right to education of pupils. (The judgments are in Dutch and can be found here and here)[1] The judgments are furthermore interesting because of their inclusive comprehension of neutrality through systematic reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This post will start by briefly shedding light on the structure of the Belgian education system and the implementation of a ban on religious signs in Flanders. We will subsequently highlight the crucial parts of the judgments of the Council of State (hereafter ‘the Council’) and conclude with some reflections.
NEW BOOK: “The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law” (E. Brems ed.)
We are happy to announce the publication of a new book entitled “The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law” edited by prof. Eva Brems and published by Cambridge University Press.
This book, unique in its kind, unites empirical research on women wearing face veils in Europe and commentary of scholars of different disciplines on this research and on face veil bans. People who have been following the case of SAS v. France, might be particularly interested in the in-depth analysis that this book provides of the empirical research several third parties referred to in the case. Continue reading
S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face Veil
By Saïla Ouald Chaib and Lourdes Peroni
This week, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights published its long-expected judgment in S.A.S. v. France. The case concerns a ban on the wearing of face veils in the public space. Although the outcome of such highly debated cases is always unpredictable, we hoped that the Court would take this opportunity to bring procedural and substantive justice to the women wearing a face veil in Europe.[1] Alas, the Court disappointingly decided the case by granting a wide margin of appreciation to France and by consequently not finding a violation of any of the ECHR provisions invoked, in particular freedom of religion, the right to private life and non-discrimination. At the same time, however, the judgment contains some positive aspects, namely respect for several requirements of what is known as “procedural justice” and departure from previous case law portraying Muslim women as oppressed. In this post, we share our first impressions on what we think are some positive and negative aspects of the Court’s reasoning. Continue reading
