How ‘Relevant’ are UN Treaty Body Views for the European Court of Human Rights’ Progress? 

By Dr. Betül Durmuş 

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Between the 12th and the 22nd of December, Strasbourg Observers is hosting a blog symposium entitled ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights: Progressive, Conservative, or Both?‘ The introduction to the symposium can be found here. In addition to this post from Betül Durmuş, the symposium includes contributions from Corina Heri, Vera Wriendt, Esra Demir-Gürsel, Harriet Ní Chinnéide and Tobias Mortier, and Jens T. Theilan.

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It is highly common for the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) to refer to the practice of the United Nations Treaty Bodies (‘UNTBs’), including their decisions on individual communications (‘Views’) under the section ‘Relevant International Materials’ (or ‘Relevant International Practice’). While these references are frequently made, it is often unclear what function they serve and whether and how they contributed to the Court’s reasoning beyond acting as ‘window dressing’. As a researcher working on the contributions of the UNTB case-law to international human rights law, my aim in this blog post is to offer a selection of references to the UNTBs’ Views by the ECtHR and discuss what these tell us for ECtHR’s progress and its relationship with the UNTBs.¹

This inquiry builds on a ‘spatial’ understanding of the term ‘progress’ which frames Europe as the birthplace of human rights. Accordingly, the ECtHR is often pictured as ‘the most advanced’ human rights system which exports human rights standards, rather than receiving them. In the minds of the drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), the United Nations was distinguished from the Council of Europe (‘CoE’) for lacking a common history and political tradition. This unique position attributed to the Council of Europe or the Court might also influence the reception of the UNTB Views. Indeed, the UNTBs have a wider geographical reach with countries from diverse histories and traditions, they are composed of “experts” rather than judges and produce “soft law” instead of binding judgments.    

In what follows, I examine the ways the UNTB Views appear in the ECtHR’s judgements: factual resemblance, normative resemblance and interpretive guidance. While the UNTB Views appear as ‘relevant’ for the Court because of their factual and normative resemblance to its own cases, they are not often treated as general interpretive guides. In addition, the nuances in the factual background of the cases and the broader transformative promises of the UN treaties seem to impede the Court to fully engage with the UNTB Views. 

Factual Resemblance 

The UNTB Views are more frequently referenced by the ECtHR when there is a factual overlap between the cases, either in terms of the state party concerned or the concrete human rights problem. This is apparent, for instance, in Koky and others v Slovakia where the ECtHR explained the two cases from the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD Committee’) against Slovakia on the same subject matter –effectiveness of domestic remedies. Further examples can be Kurt v Austria including the two early cases of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW Committee’) – Sahide Goekce v Austria and Fatma Yildirim v Austria – also concerning gender-based violence or H.F. and others v France referring to the decision of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the same issue – repatriation of children from conflict zones.  

These frequent references, however, do not promise integration, let alone a detailed engagement by the Court. For example, the Court’s approach in Kurt v Austria substantially differed from the CEDAW Committee on preventive positive obligations in the context of domestic violence. As held by the CEDAW Committee in these decisions against Austria, ‘the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity’ (Şahide Goekce, para 12.1.5). Although these are referenced, the Court took a different approach and emphasised ‘a careful weighing of the competing rights at stake’ and ‘a need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects due process and other safeguards that legitimately place restraints on the scope of their actions, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention’ (para 182). 

While factual resemblance might elevate UNTB cases to a ‘relevant’ source of law, the lack of a complete factual overlap can be a reason for the ECtHR to distance itself from their contributions. The (in)famous SAS v France (2014) concerning the ban on full-face veil in public places in France is a good example. There, the references to the HRC’s practice on religious clothing or symbols ended with a remark suggesting that the HRC ‘has not yet ruled on the question of a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places’ (para 39). This left the impression that the value of external cases is conditional on the high factual resemblance.   

Normative Resemblance 

The ECtHR consistently refers to the principle of systemic integration and holds, pursuant to Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that it takes into account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ (See, e.g. Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, para 55). However, this repeated dictum does not automatically render the Court’s reasoning receptive to external influence. Voeten argues that the value of external sources depends on a balance between enhancing the persuasive value of the decisions and maintaining deference to state authority.  

The relevance of the UNTB case-law for the Court’s own reasoning also seems to depend on the normative resemblance between the protections offered by the ECHR and the UN human rights treaties (see more extensive discussions by Strand and Fiala-Butora, Stein, Smith).  On that note, not surprisingly, the cases of the HRC stand out. For instance, in Bayatyan v Armenia, among international developments on the right to conscientious objection, the Court designated the interpretations of the HRC as ‘the most notable’ due to the similarities between Articles 8 and 18 of the ICCPR and Articles 4 and 9 of the ECHR (para 105). Similarly, both in Harkins and Edwards v The United Kingdom (para 127) and Babar Ahmad and Others v The United Kingdom (para 175), the Court held that ‘greater interpretative assistance can be derived from the approach which the Human Rights Committee has taken to the prohibition on torture and ill-treatment contained in Article 7 of the ICCPR’ compared to the decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court.  

Nonetheless, this normative resemblance does not stand in the Court’s way to disagree with the HRC case-law when it needs to do so. One striking case is Correia de Matos v. Portugal concerning Portugal’s blanket ban on self-representation in judicial proceedings. While the HRC previously found a breach of the right to defend oneself for the same applicant (see here), the Court reached the opposite conclusion. Very importantly, for the purposes of this blog post, it held that ‘even where the provisions of the Convention and those of the ICCPR are almost identical, the interpretation of the same fundamental right by the HRC and by this Court may not always correspond’ (para 135). 

For more specialised treaty bodies, such as the CRPD Committee, the relatively weaker normative resemblance is a reason for the Court to keep a distance. In Caamaño Valle v Spain, noting that ‘other instruments can offer wider protection than the Convention’, it held that it is not bound by ‘interpretations given to similar instruments by other bodies, having regard to the possible difference in the contents of the provisions of other international instruments and/or the possible difference in role of the Court and the other bodies’ (para  54). Here, the Court hinted that not only the wider protection offered by the CRPD, but also the differences in the roles of the CRPD Committee and the ECtHR might lead to different approaches.   

UNTB Views as Interpretive Guides 

Apart from factual or normative resemblance, it is not very common for the Views of the UNTBs appear as interpretative guides for progressive change in the ECtHR jurisprudence. One exception is Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary where the Court recognised the right to access to State-held information as a component of freedom of expression. Prior to that, the HRC confirmed the right to State-held information in Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan and clarified the locus standi of private individuals who might also exercise a “watchdog” function on public matters.  

In addition to a broad consensus among the Council of Europe members, the ECtHR held that ‘[a] high degree of consensus has also emerged at the international level.’ (para 140) The evidence of this consensus, according to the Court, can be seen in the text of Article 19 of the ICCPR – which is ratified by all CoE member states – as well as the interpretations of the Human Rights Committee and of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and freedom of expression (para 140-142). A particular mention was made to Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan (para 141).  

A striking aspect of Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is how the ECtHR overcame the textual differences between Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR which explicitly protects the freedom to seek and receive information. The UN sources including the Views of the HRC on Article 19 were still relevant for the ECtHR for indicating that ‘the right of access to public‑interest data and documents was inherent in freedom of expression’ (para 143).  

Concluding Remarks 

My position is not to claim that there is a direct correlation between the use of UNTB references and more expansive interpretations of the ECHR. It is not to suggest that the UNTB Views necessarily reflect ‘progress’ either. In fact, they can sometimes be used in a retrogressive way, as exemplified by the dissent in Orlandi and others v Italy referring to the HRC’s decision defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman.  

Nonetheless, I believe that the ECtHR’s progress cannot be easily detached from UN human rights treaties. From a spatial perspective, one reason is that many ECHR parties are already part of the UN treaty body system and litigants from Europe often alternate between the ECtHR and the UNTBs. This is why ‘factual resemblance’ is the most frequent reason for the Court to refer to the UNTB Views. More importantly, the UNTBs – especially the specialised bodies such as the CRC Committee, CEDAW Committee and the CRPD Committee – rest upon transformative rights and principles that extend beyond the text of the ECHR. This transformative potential should encourage the ECtHR to draw greater interpretive support from the UNTBs, rather than relying on internal or more familiar doctrinal tools.  

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This post has benefitted from the findings of the research project “Deep Impact through Soft Jurisprudence? The Contribution of United Nations Treaty Body Case Law to the Development of International Human Rights Law.” I would like to extend my gratitude to Kasyoka Phylis Mutunga for her excellent research assistance.