October 20, 2026
By Marion Sandner
In August 2026, the European Committee of Social Rights published its decision in the case FIDH and ATD Fourth World v. Belgium (Complaint No. 233/2023). The two complainant organisations sought the Committee in relation to hundreds of municipal regulations that prohibit or restrict begging in Belgium, with a particular impact on Roma and other disadvantaged groups.
This is not the first time that a European adjudicatory body addresses begging prohibitions and restrictions. While the European Committee of Social Rights, vested in 1998 with the mandate to receive collective complaints, recently boldly asserted that behaviours typically adopted by people living in poverty – oftentimes as means of subsistence – must not be criminalised (FEANTSA and FIDH v. France, see commentary on Strasbourg Observers), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) previously took an excessively deferential stance. In 2024, the ECtHR set out that, in the absence of a blanket begging ban in Denmark, restricting only those forms of begging that caused nuisance to the public was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (Dian v. Denmark). However, the Court failed to establish consistent standards for cases in which begging is the only way to ensure one’s survival and human dignity. It bears mentioning that Dian represented a U-turn from Lăcătuş v. Switzerland (2021), where the Court had indeed recognised that the applicant, being in an extremely vulnerable situation, had the right, under Article 8 of the Convention and inherent in human dignity, to be able to convey her plight and attempt to meet her basic needs through begging.
Interestingly, in the present case, rather than engaging with the complainants’ call for a legally protected right to beg – an argument that had not been put forward in the Committee’s recent case FEANTSA and FIDH v. France – the Committee focuses its examination on the compatibility and proportionality of the begging restrictions with the Revised European Social Charter (Charter). This blog post outlines how the present decision sets an important precedent from a social rights viewpoint, while also highlighting some shortcomings.
The complaint was filed with the Committee by two human rights organisations, FIDH and ATD Fourth World, alleging that the proliferation of municipal regulations that prohibit or restrict begging in Belgium disproportionately targets persons living in poverty – many of which are already particularly vulnerable and excluded from adequate social and legal protection. They contend that this is at odds with Belgium’s obligations under the Charter to provide social, legal and economic protection of family life (Article 16), to combat poverty and social exclusion (Article 30) and to prohibit any form of discrimination against Roma in relation to the aforementioned articles (Article E) (paras 2, 12). To date, 305 such regulations are in place across Belgium (para 59).
In its assessment, the Committee extensively relies on evidence submitted by the complainant organisations as well as the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (third-party submission). Notably, it references a comprehensive study conducted by the Service de la lutte contre la pauvreté et la précarité and the Federal Institute for the protection and promotion of human rights mapping municipal begging prohibitions and restrictions across Belgium – some of them prohibiting begging in public areas generally, some in specific places, some during specific periods and some aggressive and/or intrusive forms of begging only.
The Committee decides not to examine the case under Article 16, but focuses instead on Article 30 of the Charter, read alone and in conjunction with Article E. Its assessment puts emphasis on the particular vulnerability of those affected, the proportionality requirement of restrictions imposed on their rights, and the expectations placed on States parties to the Charter. It also addresses the dimension of access to effective remedies with respect to Charter rights. The sheer number of municipal restrictions, each with its own specificities and requirements, renders the legal landscape and protection of people living in poverty highly complex. This also means that it is nearly impossible to be aware of all of them, challenge them before the Conseil d’État and seek justice, especially given that they affect primarily socio-economically severely disadvantaged groups (para 109). The Committee thus holds that there are no effective remedies available to the persons who beg and who are affected by the respective municipal regulations (para 110).
Ultimately, the Committee finds a violation of Article 30 of the Charter (right to protection against poverty and social exclusion) with respect to the municipal restrictions themselves and the lack of an effective remedy available to affected individuals, as well as of Article E (non-discrimination) in conjunction with Article 30 due to the indirectly discriminatory effect, notably based on socio-economic status and ethnic origin, of the respective regulations.
The complainant organisations underscore that a comprehensive approach to addressing begging requires a legally recognised right to beg (para 58), which, they argue, has effectively already been recognised by the Belgian Conseil d’État (para 60). Notwithstanding this argument, the Committee refrains from inferring such a right from the Charter rights. Instead, it merely examines the compatibility and proportionality of the impugned begging restrictions and prohibitions.
The Committee does so, first, by confirming that there was a restriction of Article 30 (paras 87, 88), and second, by reviewing the legal basis of the restrictions (paras 89, 90), which it answers in the affirmative. The Committee then goes on to assess whether the restrictions pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 30 and the general limitations clause, Article G, such as the protection of the rights and freedom of others, the public interest, national security, public health, or morals, and whether these were indeed necessary (paras 91 et seq). Despite underscoring the ambiguity of some regulations and imprecise definitions of, for example, ‘aggressive or intrusive forms of begging’ (para 99), which effectively grants significant discretion to enforcement authorities, it accepts the Belgian Government’s submission that municipal regulations on begging aim to ensure public order, to prevent crime and to protect the rights and freedoms of others. However, the next step of its proportionality review, its necessity assessment, is significantly more thorough, resulting in a rather narrow interpretation of permissible restrictions of the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion. This closely mirrors the Committee’s approach in FEANTSA and FIDH v. France earlier this year on roughly the same subject matter.
The Committee focuses this necessity test of its proportionality review on the vulnerability and prejudice suffered by those affected by the impugned municipal regulations. It sets out that public prejudice towards persons who beg, and stigma – in other words, ‘people feeling uncomfortable in the presence of persons who beg’ – may even be at the origin of many of the municipal regulations (para 95). This is in stark contrast to the concerns about public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as submitted by the Belgian Government and referenced in the preceding paragraph.
With respect to the heightened vulnerability of those targeted by the regulations, it is worth taking a closer look at paragraph 98 of the decision. The Committee notes therein that many repressive regulations place an emphasis on begging with or by children – supposedly to tackle human trafficking and exploitative practices. Evidence cited suggests that children make up nearly 25% of the homeless (para 100). Yet, repressive measures on people who beg as a means of subsistence further aggravate their vulnerability and thereby perpetuate patterns of discrimination and social exclusion (paras 101, 106). This discriminatory effect of repressive measures is also evidenced in the joint report issued by the UN Special Rapporteurs on extreme poverty and human rights and on adequate housing in 2024. The report spelled out that laws punishing life-sustaining activities where no meaningful alternatives are available should be repealed (see also UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, para 21).
Therefore, the Committee insists on the need to better understand and address the underlying social and economic factors that contribute to situations of children (and adults) who beg. This amounts to a call for comprehensive, human rights- and child rights-based policies aimed at remedying the root causes of begging – such as insufficient protection measures against poverty and social exclusion, in line with Article 30. The Committee further underscores that preventive and support-oriented approaches are required. Thereby, it shifts the burden of proof to the decision-making authorities, away from the applicants, which clearly contrasts with the European Court of Human Rights’ general approach in the socio-economic realm.
Based on the above, the Committee concludes that the prohibitions and restrictions in point are grounded in anti-poor prejudice, which reinforces stigma and social exclusion. In this context, the Committee reiterates the international human rights framework, making reference to the ‘growing international consensus that penalising life-sustaining activities in public spaces violates human rights’ (para 105; cf. recent pronouncements by the Inter-American and African human rights bodies). It unanimously concludes that these measures were not necessary to achieve the stated legitimate aim, and therefore violate Article 30 of the Charter (para 107).
Referring back to the Charter text, Article 30 specifies the State obligation to adopt an ‘overall and co-ordinated approach to promote the effective access of persons who live or risk living in a situation of social exclusion or poverty […] to, in particular, employment, housing, training, education, culture and social and medical assistance’. The Committee specifies that this effectively requires, amongst other things, ‘a set of priorities and corresponding measures to prevent and remove obstacles to access to social rights’ (paras 53, 84), and imposes a positive obligation to seek citizen participation, especially of underrepresented groups. However, it falls short of setting out what such citizen participation is supposed to look like, and which criteria would ensure its meaningful character.
The Committee also examines the complaint through the lens of the Charter’s non-discrimination clause (Article E), read in conjunction with Article 30. The open-ended non-discrimination clause has been interpreted to include poverty and socio-economic status as grounds of discrimination (para 115). The Committee underscores that the contested regulations disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups, notably unemployed and homeless persons, persons without an income and Roma (para 118). It therefore holds (by 10 votes against 4) that the regulations indirectly discriminate against certain groups on the grounds of ethnic origin and socio-economic status, in violation of Article E of the Charter in conjunction with Article 30 (para 119).
In sum, the Committee once again demonstrates, as in FEANTSA and FIDH v. France, how an adjudicatory body should assess alleged rights infringements: by taking the situation of the rights-holder(s) and their rights as the starting point of its review. This sets an important model for other adjudicatory bodies, mostly opting for a more abstract policy review instead.
The Committee consistently highlights throughout its decision that any measure targeting behaviours typically adopted by people living in poverty should aim at strengthening access to their rights, public services, and information about these, with particular attention afforded to the most vulnerable groups (e.g. paras 85, 104). It makes it clear that begging restrictions oftentimes target those who are already in an extremely precarious situation, risking stigmatising and socially excluding them further.
Yet, despite this strong focus on the impact of the regulations on rights-holders in vulnerable situations, the Committee again fails to integrate any kind of participatory element in its assessment (just like in FEANTSA and FIDH v. France, see commentary). This is despite the increasing recognition that the genuine involvement of rights-holders as key knowledge-holders in designing and reviewing policy measures is crucial.
Moreover, the Committee’s stance that begging restrictions are permissible under the Charter if deemed proportionate within the meaning of Article G risks undermining the right to protection against poverty and exclusion for people who beg. As broad begging restrictions tend to effectively remove people who beg from the sight of others and thus ‘deprive them of one of the last means to help contribute to leading a life in accordance with human dignity’ (para 100; see also Heri’s analysis of the ECtHR’s case law on begging restrictions), this stance seems difficult to reconcile with human rights.
Nevertheless, the present decision powerfully addresses the structural vulnerabilities of persons affected by begging bans and restrictions. It demonstrates why and how any interference with the rights of people living in, or at risk of, poverty should be carefully scrutinised. Finally, it contributes to consolidating the position that international human rights law includes socio-economic grounds as prohibited grounds of discrimination, an interpretation that has emerged in recent decades.
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