October 30, 2026
By Ausra Padskocimaite
On September 3, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued an unprecedented decision in Lebedeva and Others v. Russia to strike out almost 900 individual and, in the Court’s own words, ‘potentially meritorious’ applications from its list without examining them on the merits. The aim of this post is to analyze the Court’s decision in general, while especially focusing on its reasoning related to Russia’s non-cooperation and judgment non-compliance. As this post argues, factoring a state’s (un)willingness to cooperate and to comply with judgments into the Court’s striking-out decisions rewards recalcitrant states, sets a dangerous precedent and, ultimately, risks undermining the long-term effectiveness of the system.
Since joining the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996 and ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) two years later, Russia has been one of the main contributors to the dockets of both the ECtHR, which supervises compliance with the ECHR, and the Committee of Ministers (CoM), which, pursuant to Article 46(2) ECHR, is responsible for monitoring the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. Meanwhile, under Article 46(1) ECHR, States Parties have a clear unconditional legal obligation to abide by judgments establishing violations of the Convention issued in cases against them.
According to data from the HUDOC database, as of early 2022, the Court had delivered 3,158 judgments against Russia, finding violations of the ECHR in approximately 90% of those cases. At that time, around 17,000 applications concerning Russia were still pending before the Court – and around 2,000 non-executed judgments before the CoM. Both numbers were the highest among the (then) forty-seven Contracting Parties.
Russia’s turbulent twenty-six-year-long relationship with the Council and its bodies ended dramatically on 16 March 2022 when, following its full-scale military invasion of another member state – Ukraine, Russia was first suspended and later excluded from the organization for seriously violating the membership obligations in Article 3 of the Statute of the CoE.
On 22 March 2022, the ECtHR adopted a resolution in which it decided that Russia would remain bound by the Convention until 16 September 2022, and that the Court would have jurisdiction over violations of the Convention committed until that date. From 16 September onwards, the Court has been examining the Russian cases without a Russian judge, as the position ceased to exist after Russia stopped being a party to the Convention.
It should be noted that after 16 March 2022, the Russian authorities have chosen not to engage and have stopped all cooperation with both the ECtHR and the CoM. In June of 2022, the Russian parliament adopted a law, which, among other things, prohibits the execution of judgments of the ECtHR adopted after 15 March 2022.
Russia’s abrupt and unprecedented departure from the system raised many novel questions, including how to handle the thousands of outstanding cases without a Russian judge, without the participation of the Russian government, and, most likely, without Russia’s financial contribution to the organization’s budget. Despite these challenges, the Court continued to adjudicate the outstanding Russian cases and, according to existing data, issued 936 judgments between September 2022 and September 2026. As the ECtHR notes in the Lebedeva and Others decision analyzed below (para 26), after Russia’s departure from the system, it has delivered judgments with respect to approximately 14,500 applications (while some judgments were fully reasoned, most cases were decided through a simplified procedure without examining them in detail).
Then, on September 3, the ECtHR handed down the Lebedeva and Others decision, in which it struck-out the last remaining 879 individual complaints against Russia from its list, while continuing to examine the applications (both inter-state and individual) related to Russia’s international armed conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine.
The struck-out applications – the oldest dating back to the mid-2000s – were submitted by around 1,500 applicants. Based on the limited information available in the Lebedeva decision and the HUDOC database, the cases concern various human rights issues such as domestic violence against women, the killing of a human rights activist, transgender rights, violations resulting from Russia’s military action in Chechnya and others (para 29). All the complaints concern the alleged violations committed by Russia before 16 September 2022, namely, while it was still bound by the norms of the Convention.
In Lebedeva, the ECtHR concluded that, for several reasons, the continued examination of these applications was ‘no longer justified’ under Article 37(1)(c) ECHR. The Court was also ‘not persuaded’ that the continued examination of the complaints was required by respect for human rights – a safety clause against a strike-out decision provided in Article 37(1) in fine.
The Court put forward several arguments to justify its decision. First, it argued that the applications were neither ‘of marked importance’ for Russia’s responsibility under the Convention nor did they contribute to the development of the Court’s case-law. Moreover, they were not repetitive cases and, thus, did not qualify for the ‘simplified’ procedure before the Committee formations. Second, the ECtHR referred to the ‘significant’ judicial resources necessary to process these applications and the ‘disproportionate burden’ that this would place on the system, noting that ‘substantial’ resources have already been spent on handling the applications against Russia following its departure from the system. Finally, the ECtHR repeatedly highlighted Russia’s non-cooperation with the Court and its refusal to comply with its judgments. Ultimately, the ECtHR argued that its decision was motivated by the need to protect ‘the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system’ (para 47).
Several excellent commentaries have already critically assessed the Court’s reasoning, highlighting its problematic balancing of different values at stake. It is beyond the scope of this commentary to address all of the Court’s arguments, but it is deeply worrisome that a human rights court has to prioritize some victims over others. Meanwhile, the Court’s claim that 879 applications – a small fraction of approximately 60,000 applications currently pending before it – constitute a ‘significant’ judicial burden, combined with the fact that some of the applications addressed in Lebedeva have been lingering in the system for almost two decades, raises serious questions about the system’s ‘effective functioning’ that the Court claims to be protecting (para 46).
To begin with, the text of the Convention strictly divides the competencies when it comes to compliance with the Court’s judgments, empowering only the CoM to supervise their execution under Article 46(2). Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 46(3-5), the Court has the competence to rule on the interpretation of its judgment as well as to decide whether a state has violated its obligations to comply with a binding judgment in the context of the so-called infringement proceedings. Such proceedings, pursuant to Article 46(4), can only be initiated by the CoM. The Court itself has on numerous occasions affirmed this division of competencies, emphasizing that its involvement in the execution of its judgments was limited.
Second, throughout its decision, the Court notes the ‘exceptional’ circumstances of the Russian cases, which, in its view, require exceptional solutions. One of them appears to be the striking out of the 879 individual applications listed in the lengthy Appendix of the Lebedeva decision. Yet, while Russia’s current stance towards the ECtHR and the CoM is, indeed, extreme, its refusal to comply with judgments of the ECtHR – like that of several other States Parties – is not unique.
Although legally assessing compliance with the ECtHR’s judgments is challenging for various reasons, the fact that at the end of 2025, most states had “pending” (not fully complied with) judgments before the CoM suggests that the problem of non-compliance is not limited to Russia. According to data from the HUDOC-EXEC database, at the time of writing, more than 1,400 judgments have not been executed for over 10 years. And this is merely a snapshot of the current status quo, which does not include the cases in which compliance occurred only after a lengthy delay.
The Court has even expressly found that two countries – Azerbaijan (in 2019) and Türkiye (in 2022) – have failed to comply with its binding judgments in good faith, thereby violating the obligation under Article 46(1) – curiously, such proceedings were never commenced against Russia. Yet, this did not prevent the Court from continuing to adjudicate new cases against either Azerbaijan or Türkiye.
In fact, the ECtHR has recently issued its third judgment against Türkiye in the case of Kavala v. Türkiye (No.2), which was brought by the same applicant – Turkish human rights defender Osman Kavala, who has been unlawfully imprisoned since 2017. The ECtHR found new violations of Kavala’s rights largely resulting from Türkiye’s persistent non-compliance with the Court’s previous judgments. Meanwhile, data shows that, at the time of writing, Azerbaijan has only fully complied with 100 out of 465 judgments and has for several years had one of the lowest levels of judgment compliance.
In light of this, it is difficult to see why Russia’s non-compliance with existing judgments should be treated differently from that of Türkiye or Azerbaijan. The Court’s decision to discontinue the adjudication of only some cases because of Russia’s expected non-compliance – while simultaneously continuing to adjudicate others, such as conflict-related cases – is equally puzzling.
Moreover, even while it was a State Party, Russia never had good judgment compliance and has even openly refused to execute two judgments of the ECtHR (Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia andOAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia). Furthermore, it – though by no means the only state to do so – has often engaged in what could be described as an ‘imitation of compliance,’ meaning that it would interact with the CoM and submit all the required documents, while failing to adopt any meaningful compliance measures – or even adopting measures that undermine the spirit or the letter of an existing judgment (see, for example, Russia’s response to the first Alekseyev v. Russia judgment from 2010). This, however, has never dissuaded the Court from adjudicating new cases against Russia, nor did it deter the Russian applicants from continuing to bring them. And rightly so.
Refusing to adjudicate a case altogether because of a country’s non-compliance and non-cooperation sends a signal that such resistance pays off and may incentivise further defiance. This risk should be taken seriously given the (non)compliance problems already facing the system. Moreover, while Russia remains the only state to depart from the system in recent years, the prospect of other states following suit is no longer a mere theoretical one. Signaling that extreme defiance can help evade accountability for past human rights violations sets a dangerous precedent for other states that might leave the system in the future.
Finally, unpacking what compliance with judgments in these 879 cases might actually entail raises further questions about the Court’s extensive focus on Russia’s non-compliance. As the Court’s practice shows, to comply with a judgment, a state may need to take different types of measures, known as individual and general measures. Individual measures usually include monetary compensation (awarded as “just satisfaction” under Article 41) and other actions aimed at redressing the damage caused to a specific applicant. Meanwhile, general measures are directed towards preventing similar violations from occurring in the future. It is questionable whether, under international law, Russia is still required to adopt general measures, given that it has left the treaty and does not have a future-looking relationship with the other parties.
The necessity for individual measures depends on the specifics of each case; however, as the Court has explained in its case-law, in many instances, the judgment per se may constitute sufficient ‘just satisfaction.’ Thus, while at the moment Russia is unlikely to honor any monetary awards or adopt other individual measures, not all judgments will require such measures. Moreover, Russia’s patchy compliance with the Court’s monetary awards has never influenced the applicants’ willingness to continue bringing their cases to Strasbourg. Ultimately, the applicants themselves are best placed to determine whether an application before the Court offers any ‘practical individual benefits’ to them (para 46).
In striking out the applications, the Court has handed the Russian government exactly what it had tried to achieve for years – the possibility of being a member in Europe’s leading human rights organization while violating its human rights obligations with impunity (given that most violations in Lebedeva occurred before March 2022). Although the system could not ensure Russia’s compliance with the Court’s judgments, at least it held the government legally accountable.
While the Court correctly observes that, under international law, Russia remains responsible for all violations of the Convention and that its judgments constitute merely ‘authoritative determinations,’ this provides little practical recourse to victims. Without a binding ruling, few states – particularly authoritarian ones like Russia – will voluntarily redress abuses they refuse to acknowledge in the first place.
In a similar manner, the Court’s reference to the possibility of restoring the cases under Article 37(2) “as a result of the Russian Federation’s return to the Convention jurisdiction” or because of “other developments” is of little consolation to the applicants who have already spent years waiting for justice, especially given the improbability of such a political change happening in the near future, and the Court’s reluctance to rely on the provision in the past.
To conclude, when the ECHR system was created by ten Western European democracies in the aftermath of World War II, the Court’s judgments were envisioned as an early warning system to alert states when democratic backsliding in one of its members was occurring. While States Parties themselves bear the primary responsibility for complying with both the norms of the Convention and the Court’s judgments, it is an open question whether the ECtHR, the CoM and other CoE institutions could have (and should have) done more to prevent Russia’s descent into what the founding fathers termed ‘tyranny.’ The least they can do now is ensure that Russia is held accountable for the human rights violations it has committed while being a member, in the hope that one day such judgments might also work in the opposite direction – namely, assist the country in a future democratic transition, if and when it occurs.
In Lebedeva and Others, the Court underscores that its decision to dismiss the remaining 879 individual applications against Russia is guided by the need to protect the ‘long-term effectiveness of the Convention system’ and repeatedly invokes Russia’s non-compliance with the Court’s judgments. There is no doubt that compliance with the Court’s final judgments is central to an effective human rights system. Consequently, Contracting Parties and bodies of the CoE should continue to seek ways to improve such compliance. Rewarding states that outright resist it, however, will likely lead to more violations of human rights and more non-compliance – both of which are detrimental to the long-term effectiveness of the system.
1 Comment
Indeed, applicants know best what a judgment would mean to them. But they are not alone in the waiting room: the Court’s time is paid for in other people’s delays.
Nor does dividing 879 complex applications by 60,000 turn them into an afternoon’s work. The percentage shrinks; the work does not.
The Convention needs States willing to play by common rules. Through its war of aggression and rejection of Strasbourg’s authority, Russia has repudiated that shared legal space. The Court can pronounce responsibility; it cannot conjure cooperation. Tragically, the loss of protection falls on people who had no say in that rupture.
Giving precedence to cases where a judgment might still change someone’s life is therefore painful but defensible. Calling it “rewarding Russia” captures the bitter irony, but ducks the harder question: whose protection should wait for another judgment Russia will ignore?