November 20, 2026
By Bhavya Johari
In Strashunskyy v. Ukraine (no. 6522/19), delivered on 17 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously found procedural and substantive violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) after staff of a municipal care home forcibly took a resident to a psychiatric hospital. The judgment adopts the vocabulary of disability rights. Where earlier case law spoke of the vulnerability of ‘mentally ill persons’ (Bureš v. the Czech Republic, para 85), it speaks of ‘persons with psychosocial disabilities’ and locates their vulnerability partly in ‘the imbalance of power inherent in the relationship between residents and institutional staff’ (para 46). Yet it cites no provision of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Ukraine ratified on 4 February 2010, not even as an aid to interpretation. A recent post on this blog argued that providing psychiatric care does not justify imposing it. Taking that problem to the threshold of hospitalisation, this post argues that, having named institutional power, the Court treated the resident’s refusal as a problem to be managed rather than a decision that only law could override.
The applicant was declared legally incapacitated in June 2016, and his mother became his guardian (para 5). He lived at the Zvenyhorod Boarding House for Disabled and Elderly People (para 6). On 23 November 2016, following a psychiatrist’s referral, staff told him to pack for hospital, and he refused (para 14). On his mother’s account, two staff members held him while a third punched him, and he was immobilised in the car (para 7). The staff said that he became aggressive, threw furniture and bit a nurse (para 14). Doctors recorded concussion and multiple haematomas (para 8). A court ordered his involuntary hospitalisation the next day (para 9), and the director disciplined a junior nurse, a facilities manager, a laboratory assistant and an auxiliary worker for ‘rough handling’ (para 10). The police repeatedly closed the investigation, attributing the injuries to falls during restraint or to the staff ‘overcoming his aggressive behaviour’ (paras 15 and 17). The District Court twice quashed those decisions for want of an expert opinion (paras 16 and 18), but both investigations were eventually terminated (paras 19 and 20).
Under the procedural limb, the Court first held the investigation ineffective, chiefly because no medical expert examination was carried out and the staff’s qualifications were never established (para 40). Nor was there any sign that the investigation had looked into the disciplinary sanctions, which, in the Court’s view, refuted the account that the injuries were ‘entirely his fault’ (para 41).
The substantive limb proceeded on two tracks: the negative obligation ‘to refrain from inflicting serious harm’ and positive obligations ‘to take appropriate measures’ against ill-treatment (para 47). On the negative track, the Court then restated the rule in Bouyid v. Belgium in broader terms: ‘where an individual is under the authority and control of State agents, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by that individual’s own conduct diminishes human dignity’ (para 45). It added that the vulnerability of persons with psychosocial disabilities applies ‘with particular force’ in social-care institutions (para 46). The injuries were medically documented, and although the Court could not establish ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that he was beaten in the manner alleged, their occurrence under the staff’s ‘authority and control’ required the Government to explain them and to show that any force used was ‘justified, strictly necessary and proportionate’ (para 50). The domestic authorities had made no serious assessment of ‘the extent to which the applicant’s conduct necessitated the use of physical coercion’ (para 51). The Government had therefore not shown that the interference with the applicant’s physical integrity was ‘strictly required by the situation’ (para 52).
The positive track turned on preparation. Staff had to ‘do their best’ to secure the applicant’s integrity, and his objection ‘could hardly be described as unpredictable and exceptional’ (para 53). The Court doubted that there had been any ‘legal basis and a need to proceed to a forceful transfer’ and found no sign that staff were ‘duly prepared for the possibility that he would not cooperate’ (para 53). The investigation had not clarified whether the staff were even ‘competent to deal with such a situation’ (para 54), and, given the applicant’s ‘complete dependence’ on them, ‘particular care was required in planning and carrying out measures involving coercion’ (para 55). He was therefore not afforded protection ‘commensurate with his situation’ (para 56). It concluded that the authorities had fallen short of ‘both their negative and positive obligations’ (para 57). There are no separate opinions.
Paragraph 46 is most important in disability law. Bouyid applied its rule to persons ‘deprived of [their] liberty’ or ‘confronted with law-enforcement officers’ (para 88) and traced their vulnerability to being ‘under the control of the police or a similar authority’ (para 107). Strashunskyy extends that reasoning to care staff and locates vulnerability in the institutional relationship rather than in the diagnosis alone. The features it names – namely, residents who ‘depend on staff for their daily needs’ and whose ability to ‘complain or obtain evidence may be significantly limited’– belong to the institution, not to the impairment. That is the CRPD’s social model, under which disability results from interaction with ‘attitudinal and environmental barriers’ (Preamble (e)). The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities likewise defines institutions by their structure, listing among their ‘defining elements’ a ‘lack of control over day-to-day decisions’ and ‘a paternalistic approach in service provision’ (Guidelines on deinstitutionalization, including in emergencies, para 14). The premise also does doctrinal work in the judgment itself. It informs the Government’s burden to explain injuries sustained under the staff’s ‘authority and control’ (Strashunskyy, para 50). The Court applied this burden ‘having regard to the applicant’s particular vulnerability’ (para 52), and so meets the evidential disadvantage that Article 13(1) CRPD addresses in requiring ‘effective access to justice’, including ‘at investigative and other preliminary stages’.
If institutional power is the source of vulnerability in social care, the first safeguard is a legal limit on who may exercise it. The only restraint provision the Court set out, section 8 of the Psychiatric Care Act 2000, governs measures taken ‘whilst psychiatric care is being provided’ and ‘under the constant supervision of a psychiatrist or other healthcare professional’ (para 22). After its 2017 visit, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) recorded a care-home director’s concern that the Ministry of Health rules on restraint ‘did not apply to “internats”’, as such homes are known, and asked Ukraine to clarify ‘the legal basis for any possible use of mechanical restraint’ there (CPT/Inf (2018) 41, para 169). In 2019, the Ministry of Social Policy told the CPT that, in psycho-neurological internats without a psychiatric-care licence, ‘no recourse to means of restraint was authorised’ (CPT/Inf (2020) 1, para 35). Hospitalisation, too, had legal preconditions. Less than six months before the transfer, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, citing Article 12(4) CRPD, had held that, pending legislation, hospitalising a legally incapacitated person at a guardian’s request was ‘possible only by a court decision’ (CPT/Inf (2018) 41, para 147). Admission on a psychiatrist’s decision remained available, subject to prompt review by a psychiatric commission and a court (CPT/Inf (2018) 41, para 145). The judgment identifies neither a licence nor an admission route, and the Government made no submissions on the merits (para 33). The Court registered the gap and stepped around it: ‘assuming that there was such basis and need’ (para 53).
That assumption weakens the Bouyid test itself. Force is compatible with Article 3 only if ‘made strictly necessary by that individual’s own conduct’ (para 45). On the staff’s own account, the aggression followed the applicant’s refusal to go (para 14). If a refusal, and the resistance an unauthorised removal provokes, could supply necessity, every such removal would generate its own justification. The Court’s case law has already closed that circle. In M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), following Bureš (para 99), it held that restraint ‘can hardly be justified by the fact that a person resists their application’ (para 109). It also noted that the circumstances suggested restraint had been used when the applicant ‘did not consent to her admission to hospital’, in contravention of international standards and ‘the requirements of the relevant domestic law’ (para 108). Regrettably, Strashunskyy cites M.S. only for its investigative principles (paras 35 and 36).
Disability law explains why the order of questions matters. It does so as an aid to interpretation. The Court’s jurisdiction extends to ‘the interpretation and application of the Convention’ (Article 32 § 1 ECHR), so the CRPD cannot be applied as such, but it can guide that interpretation, as it did in Stanev v. Bulgaria, where the Grand Chamber read Article 6 § 1 in light of the ‘growing importance’ that international instruments, the CRPD among them, attach to granting persons with mental disorders ‘as much legal autonomy as possible’ (paras 244 and 245). Paragraph 55 invokes respect for the applicant’s ‘personal autonomy’, and the CRPD lists ‘individual autonomy’ among its general principles (Article 3(a)). On that reading, a refusal is an exercise of that autonomy, not ‘own conduct’ capable of making force strictly necessary (para 45), and not a symptom to be anticipated. Article 14(1) CRPD requires that persons with disabilities enjoy liberty and security of person ‘on an equal basis with others’ and that any deprivation of liberty be ‘in conformity with the law’. A refusal to be taken to hospital may therefore be overridden only by someone with legal authority to do so. This reading needs none of the contested positions on impairment-based detention that the Grand Chamber declined to adopt in Rooman v. Belgium (para 205). By treating the objection as predictable (para 53), the Court turned a question of authority into one of logistics.
Having set authority aside, the Court placed preparation under positive obligations. That choice matters, as the precedents behind each track show: those on the positive track frame duties of protection and prevention, whereas those on the negative track address force used by State agents themselves, as in this case. On the positive track, the framework it invoked (para 47) reaches beyond the State’s own conduct: X and Others v. Bulgaria frames it as protection against ill-treatment ‘including ill-treatment administered by private individuals’ (para 177). The emphasis on foreseeability also echoes V v. the Czech Republic, which found ‘nothing unusual’ about acute psychiatric patients ‘being agitated or violent’ and expected institutions to be ‘appropriately staffed and equipped’ (para 100). There, the Court examined positive obligations in line with its approach to ‘non-intentional infringements of the right to life’ (para 89). Judge Gnatovskyy, who sat in Strashunskyy, wrote in V that the Court could also have found a breach of the negative obligation but ‘preferred not to express itself at all’ on it (concurring opinion, para 11). Strashunskyy answers that criticism in its result (paras 52 and 57), yet continues to tread the softer path, asking whether staff did ‘everything they could’ (para 53). That measure has already seeped into the negative track (‘everything reasonably possible’, para 51).
On the negative track, the Court has treated planning as part of the necessity test. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom examined ‘the planning and control of the actions under examination’ in deciding whether force was absolutely necessary (paras 150 and 194). Earlier this year, Makki v. Denmark folded an organisational delay, ‘for whatever reason’, into the strict-necessity assessment of prolonged restraint (paras 116 and 117). That training is a positive obligation (Bouyid, para 108) does not alter the point: training is a standing duty, whereas preparing a particular removal is part of the removal. The CRPD likewise treats the denial of individually ‘necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments’ as discrimination (Article 2), not as a shortfall in effort.
Strashunskyy deserves credit for carrying Bouyid into social care and for naming institutional power. Its value depends on the order in which its questions are read. Read as written, it invites courts to ask whether staff were ready for a disabled resident’s refusal. Read with Bureš and M.S., it should first lead them to ask who had the authority to override that refusal, and only then to ask whether the force used was strictly necessary. The CPT agrees that, ‘as a matter of principle, means of restraint should not be applied in social care establishments’, and where de-escalation fails, staff should ‘call an ambulance’ to transfer the resident to ‘a more appropriate health-care setting’ (CPT/Inf (2026) 11, para 41). Authority, not preparedness, should be the first safeguard. The judgment is not yet final (Article 44 § 2 ECHR).