From institutionalisation to exploitation: structural failures and stereotyping in I.C. v. The Republic of Moldova

By Lorena Sosa

The case of I.C. v. The Republic of Moldova intersects with two strands of ECtHR jurisprudence: (1) the Court’s developing understanding of sexual violence, rape and sexual exploitation, and (2) its evolving anti-stereotyping framework, particularly regarding persons with disabilities. Against the backdrop of landmark rulings, this judgment further enriches the Court’s often conflicting jurisprudence by explicitly engaging with intersectional discrimination, structural inequalities, and the harms of stereotyping.

Overview of facts

The case concerns I.C., a woman with an intellectual disability, abandoned at birth and with no known relatives, who, after spending her whole life in care, including 24 years in a neuropsychiatric institution, was placed in 2013 into the care of a family living on a remote farm. Her placement was presented as part of Moldova’s deinstitutionalisation efforts and seeking to ‘integrate the applicant into society as far as possible’ (§ 109) but was arranged with the specific intention that she would become the “wife” of one of the farm’s workers, who ‘had wanted a family’. Over the next five years, neither the assigned social worker nor any other official visited I.C., who was forced to perform unpaid labour under coercive conditions. Throughout this time, she was also sexually abused and raped by one of the farm’s owners (I.P.), who manipulated her using threats and psychological pressure. She escaped multiple times but, faced with a lack of shelter and food, always returned.

Despite these indicators of the particular vulnerability of the applicant to trafficking, forced labour, and sexual violence, the Moldovan authorities failed to protect I.C. or conduct a proper investigation. Domestic courts dismissed her complaint on trafficking, characterising her placement in the family as consensual and in line with legal requirements, ignoring the context of coercion and disadvantaged position due to the intersection of her disability, gender and history of institutionalisation. Psychological reports describing I.C.’s level of development and autonomy, her trauma derived from the abuse, and the absence of exaggerations in her account were dismissed by the domestic Court, relying instead on the biased testimony of witnesses working at the farm and the social worker. As a result, the claims of rape and sexual abuse, subsumed against her desires in the purpose of sexual exploitation of the charges of trafficking, were dismissed based on discriminatory assumptions. 

Summary of the Judgment

The applicant complained that her deinstitutionalisation from a State asylum and placement in a family, where she had been forced to work without payment, had amounted to treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Convention (prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labour), and that the authorities had failed to prevent such treatment and carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of her placement and exploitation. She explained that her lifelong institutionalisation had contributed to it, reducing her opportunities to consent to or resist the arrangements made for her living at the farm, the domestic chores and the sexual relations with the master of the farm, arguing that ‘she had become accustomed to obeying orders without resisting and to perceiving abuse as normal’ (§ 97). Moreover, such lifelong institutionalisation resulted in a lack of a social network, which explained why she always returned to the farm (§ 100). Institutionalisation contributes to peoples’ vulnerability and disadvantaged social position, necessarily shaping the meaning of ‘autonomy’ and ‘coercion.’ Notably, the applicant points to the understanding of “deinstitutionalisation” and “living in a community” by reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and General Comment No. 5 on living independently and being included in the community, which emphasise the importance of a person’s freedom of choice, control and self-determination in that context.

The Court considered that there was prima facie evidence that the applicant had been the victim of treatment contrary to Article 4, showing a clear intersectional understanding of her disadvantaged position due to ‘her intellectual disability and gender, set against the background of her lifelong institutionalisation (which) undoubtedly suggested that she belonged to a vulnerable group’ (§ 149). This intersectional perspective shaped the Court’s understanding of ‘exploitative purpose’ and the examination of whether there was an appropriate legislative and administrative framework affording the applicant practical and effective protection. Given the weaknessesfound in the framework and policies on the deinstitutionalisation of persons with intellectual disabilities, the Court found a violation of Art. 4 in its substantive limb, despite the adequacy of the Moldovan criminal legal framework against trafficking and/or other forms of treatment contrary to art. 4. The Court’s reasoning drew from the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities and the CRPD Committee Concluding observations on the initial report of Moldova, which noted that there were no community-based services and no legal framework for supported decision-making for persons with disabilities. These deficiencies in deinstitutionalisation policy, particularly the lack of support services and monitoring mechanisms, resulted in the lack of protection of the applicant, despite there being sufficientindicators of her real and immediate risk of becoming a victim of trafficking or exploitation. 

Regarding the procedural obligation to investigate, the Court found several flaws, constituting a violation of Article 4. Notably, the Court pointed out that the authorities assessed the applicant’s vulnerability inadequately based on the ‘biased’ account of the social worker (§ 200) and the dismissal of the psychological reports. This failure, in turn, resulted in the absence of any procedural accommodation, directly impacting the interpretation of the victim’s contradictory statements. The Court adopted a clear intersectional perspective in its assessment, highlighting how the authorities had dismissed the criminal charges, arguing that the applicant consented to her placement in the farm without assessing whether such consent was possible considering her lack of legal capacity, the potentially coercive environment, her lifelong institutionalisation, the absence of supported decision-making and her intellectual disability (§171-172). 

Besides adopting an intersectional approach to assess the applicant’s vulnerability and the state’s obligations concerning Article 4, the Court’s ruling captures the complexity of her situation by analysing it beyond that single provision. The applicant had claimed that the prosecutor’s decision to reclassify her complaints of sexual violence from standalone charges to elements of the trafficking charges prevented them from adequately addressing the sexual violence she suffered. Since the alleged sexual violence would have been in the context of trafficking, yet not necessarily with the purpose of trafficking, the Court considered that a separate examination of the authorities’ approach to the applicant’s complaints about rape and sexual abuse was indeed warranted. It examined it under Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and 8 (right to respect for private life) separately from Article 4. (§ 92). Moreover, since Moldova’s failure to protect the applicant from exploitation and abuse was due to the general stereotypes against women with intellectual disabilities held by the authorities, the Court considered it had to examine the violation of Article 14 (non-discrimination) separately and could not be absorbed into the complaints under Articles 3, 4 and 8 taken alone.

The Court unanimously found that Moldova had violated Articles 4, 3 and 8, and 14 of the Convention and granted the full amount of the applicant’s required compensation for non-pecuniary damage, costs and expenses.

Comment on judgment: a good example of the potential of an intersectional approach to anti-stereotyping

This judgment joins a long line of previous cases on sexual violence that confirm the States’ positive obligation under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to penalise and effectively prosecute any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim. However, in this case, by taking the opportunity to confront the stereotyping of persons with disabilities head-on, the Court nuanced the understanding of sexual consent and coercion, strengthened the connection between the biased response of authorities and secondary victimisation, and importantly, bringing traditional assumptions around the sexuality of persons with disabilities, domestic chores, and labour to the question. 

The judgment’s reasoning is guided by and positively impacted by two viewpoints. On the one hand, the Court makes an explicit recognition of intersectional vulnerabilities -combining intellectual disability, gender, and institutionalisation- as core components of exploitation and sexual violence. This intersectional framing explicitly challenges stereotypes rooted in assumptions about intellectual disabilities and gender roles, advancing beyond earlier cases (see, e.g., Kocherov and Sergeyeva, Caamaño Valle). On the other hand, whereas earlier cases (such as Caamaño Valle, Kargakis or Stoian) showed reluctance in embracing CRPD principles, in the present case, the Court resumes the approach of such instances as Guberina v. Croatia and explicitly engages with CRPD, condemning the absence of adequate safeguards and proactive accommodations for disabled persons.

Implications of the judgment’s anti-stereotyping approach: on sexual consent and beyond

The Court’s jurisprudence on sexual violence has evolved significantly, notably through landmark cases like X and Y v. the Netherlands, which emphasised the state’s positive obligations to protect vulnerable persons, and M.C. v. Bulgaria, which established non-consent as the defining feature of rape, thereby addressing harmful stereotypes about rape requiring physical resistance. Recent rulings like J.L. v. Italy and X v. Cyprus underscored how judicial reliance on stereotypes (victim-blaming, assumptions about victims’ sexuality or credibility, see blog posts here and here, respectively) constitutes secondary victimisation and structural discrimination, reflecting a transformative shift in the Court’s understanding of stereotyping as both cause and manifestation of gender inequality. Aligning closely with the reasoning in these cases, the Court clearly states in I.C. that the authorities’ treatment of the applicant amounted to secondary victimisation -notably due to the reliance on prejudiced stereotypes, the dismissal of her credibility, and the minimisation of the abuse she suffered- contrasting with earlier cases where the term’ secondary victimisation’ was used sparingly or only implied. 

The recognition of secondary victimisation in I.C. not only reinforces the need for victim-sensitive procedures but also confirms the structural nature of harm inflicted through the justice system. Significantly, by using the term explicitly, the Court strengthens its normative stance and contributes to a clearer, more consistent jurisprudence on how institutional failures -particularly those grounded in stereotypes- can constitute separate and severe forms of harm.

Beyond these general considerations connected to biased understandings of sexual consent, I.C.v Moldova may have implications beyond sexual violence cases. Throughout the case, several witness testimonies referred to the applicant’s sexuality and her alcohol consumption. At the same time, the police officers had directly asked her if she had enjoyed having sexual relations with the accused. The Court considered such a line of questioning inappropriate, insensitive and harmful, and irrelevant since the investigation should have focused on the absence of consent. Moreover, besides confirming that such police behaviour stems from and contributed to the victim blaming, the Court’s clear distinction between consensual and non-consensual sexual relations, when brought to the particular context of disability, helps question assumptions about the sexuality of persons with disabilities and steps away from their too common representation as a-sexual human beings. 

In fact, the case reveals the emotional complexity of persons with intellectual disabilities by recognising I.C.’s desire to have a family, children and own a house, and her capacity to contribute economically. This ‘productive’ capacity is explicitly addressed by the Court’s challenge to the state’s dismissal of the material value of unremunerated domestic or farm work carried out by women. The Court found that ‘such views seem to convey stereotypes, preconceived beliefs and myths about persons with disabilities lacking agency, about a woman’s role being that of a housewife who attends to the needs of a man and the family, and about the domestic work carried out by women lacking any economic value’ (§ 221).

The question remains whether the Court will be able to recognise the agency of persons with disabilities when it comes to establishing interpersonal relationships (unlike previous cases, e.g. Delecolle and blogpost) and establish the responsibilities of states to provide the appropriate services that allow persons with disabilities to live autonomously and in community without facing risks of exploitation and abuse, despite previous hesitation around reasonable accommodation (notably, Stoian). After all, the Court emphasises in I.C. the positive obligations of states to support individuals with disabilities transitioning from institutional care to community settings. While the Court considered that the lack of a legal guardian, support network and community services before and during her stay at the farm prevented the applicant from receiving any procedural accommodation during the investigation and led to the acquittal of the suspects (§ 170), a similar reasoning could be expected concerning the positive obligations of states around reasonable accommodation. In fact, as earlier established in Çam v. Turkey and Guberina v. Croatia, the Court confirmed that Article 14 must be read in the light of international requirements regarding reasonable accommodation (§ 213).

Systemic and Structural dimensions of the case

I.C. v. Moldova firmly situates individual violations within broader structural failures, critiquing Moldova’s inadequate protective frameworks around deinstitutionalisation. Relying on different UN and CoE reports on Moldova, the Court highlighted the existence of systemic discrimination against persons with disabilities, and the intersectional discrimination faced by women with disabilities (§ 218). This attention to the structural context is strengthened by the Court’s analysis of the implications of both institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation. 

In the ruling, the Court recognises that institutionalisation not only increases the risk of abuse while in confinement, but it can continue to shape people’s intersectional disadvantage after they leave the institution, particularly when no support networks are put in place (§149). ‘Deinstitutionalisation – finds the Court – requires a systemic transformation beyond the closure of institutional settings and provides for individualised support services and inclusive mainstream services, as well as monitoring mechanisms’ (§ 156). In the absence of such systemic transformation, ‘newer forms of institutionalisation which preserve the same – if not a higher – risk of abuse and exploitation’ can emerge (ibid). This systemic analysis contrasts favourably with approaches observed in earlier cases like Caamaño Valle, aligning with transformative equality principles to address root causes of inequality and systemic vulnerability.

Although the Court highlights systemic failings, it could have provided a more profound critique on how broader institutional and societal biases toward intellectual disability, gender, and stigma of persons in institutions facilitate abuse, thus further reinforcing structural transformation.

Conclusion

The judgment in I.C. v. Moldova represents a significant step forward in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, bridging and advancing multiple lines of the Court’s case law—from sexual violence to disability rights and from anti-stereotyping to substantive equality, while explicitly upholding principles central to the CRPD—helping to resolve some of the tensions observed in previous rulings. 

However, considering the Court’s previously contradictory trajectory, vigilance is required to ensure future judgments maintain this high standard and do not regress into more hesitant or superficial approaches. The case presents advocates and scholars with powerful leverage to promote further jurisprudential consistency, intersectional sensitivity, and meaningful enforcement of disability rights. The challenge now lies in ensuring this trajectory is consolidated, deepened, and consistently applied across the Court’s broader body of work.