July 23, 2025
By Davit Khachatryan
On 9 July 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its highly anticipated judgment in the inter-State case Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia. This landmark case addresses Russia’s responsibility for a litany of human rights violations arising from the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014, including the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, as well as from Russia’s military operations in Ukraine beginning in 2022.
The case is an amalgamation of four interstate applications lodged by Ukraine (in 2014, 2016, and 2022) and by the Netherlands (2020) against the Russian Federation. These applications were eventually joined and examined together by the Grand Chamber. Broadly, Ukraine’s complaints alleged “administrative practices” of continuous and widespread Convention breaches by Russia in the conflict zone (such as indiscriminate shelling of civilians, extrajudicial killings, and destruction of property) (§§ 168-261), as well as specific incidents like child abductions, arguing these amounted to patterns of violations condoned by Russia (§§ 262-287). “Administrative practice” here is a legal concept developed by the Court to refer to patterns of repeated violations that state authorities allegedly tolerate and condone (e.g., para. 159). The Netherlands’ complaint focused on the downing of MH17 and Russia’s failure to investigate or cooperate in establishing accountability for that atrocity, invoking the right to life (Article 2) and related obligations (§§ 301-354).
On 25 January 2023, the Grand Chamber issued a partial admissibility decision, declaring most of the claims admissible. The Court found that the areas of eastern Ukraine controlled by separatists were “from 11 May 2014 and up to at least 26 January 2022” under the “jurisdiction” of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention (§§ 690-7). 26 other States (all Council of Europe members) and one non-member (Canada) intervened as third parties, reflecting the case’s importance for the international community.
The Grand Chamber’s judgment marks a watershed moment for the European Convention’s reach over the conduct of hostilities. It confronted the legacy of Georgia v. Russia (II), where the Court had found that the active phase of hostilities precluded effective control, and thus excluded Article 1 jurisdiction (§ 144). That judgment was widely and wisely criticized for leaving battlefield conduct beyond the reach of human rights law.
Ukraine insisted that Russia’s missiles, artillery rounds, and siege from 2014-2022 engaged Russia’s Convention responsibility (§§ 210-223). Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain echoed that line, emphasising (in their joint note at §§ 234–243) that strategically planned, cross-border firepower itself constitutes authority and control over persons.
By contrast, France (§§ 244-248) and the United Kingdom (§§ 252-8), tried to rescue the Georgia II template. Both urged that Article 1 should apply only once Russia had effective territorial control or physical custody: The UK warned that anything broader would expose battlefield decisions to unbounded Strasbourg scrutiny; France invoked the language from Georgia v. Russia II almost verbatim, quoting the Grand Chamber’s conclusion that “the very reality of armed confrontation and fighting… in a context of chaos means that there is no control over an area” (§ 246, citing Georgia v. Russia (II), § 126)).
The Court used this judgment to determine whether this “context of chaos” was an all-purpose carveout or, rather, a fact-specific and temporary exception. It emphasized that even outside occupied or controlled territory, a state can exercise “authority and control over individuals” through the use of force abroad (§ 354). The circumstances in Ukraine were not those of chaotic, unplanned violence but rather of “extensive, strategically planned military attacks … wholly at odds with any notion of chaos” (§ 361).
By stating that the Russian Federation assumed a degree of responsibility over those individuals affected by its attacks, and thus exercised authority and control over them for purposes of Article 1 (§ 361), the Court established that launching and directing sustained, organized attacks is sufficient to bring the victims within the Convention’s protective reach. This precedent means that the Court can address the full spectrum of state-conducted or -directed violence against civilians, closing the loophole that Georgia v. Russia II seemed to have created.
The Court makes clear that Strasbourg does not accept a “lex specialis” carve-out that would displace human rights law in wartime. Instead, the Court reaffirms its systemic-integration approach: “the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum; it should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law … including international humanitarian law” (§ 427). Crucially, it holds that “there is no circumstance in which international humanitarian law will apply to the complete exclusion of the Convention’s human rights guarantees” (§ 428). Thus, while the Court will “take into account relevant provisions of IHL where relevant when determining the scope of human-rights guarantees” (§ 429), it never permits the Convention itself to fall away. This synergy makes the ECHR an effective instrument even amid armed conflict.
This approach is particularly evident when the Court addresses the “mistakes of fact” problem in targeting, highlighted by the downing of MH17, noting that while mistakes are “very common in armed conflict” (§ 423), the decisive question is whether “all feasible precautions” were taken before an attack (§ 424).
On the matter of derogations, the Court’s position is unambiguous. Since Russia “did not avail itself of its right to derogate under Article 15,” the full suite of Convention rights remained operative throughout the conflict (§ 426). The absence of derogation means that Russia cannot now rely on the article’s “lawful acts of war” clause or any purported wartime exception to justify its conduct. As neither Ukraine nor the Netherlands advanced jus ad bellum arguments, the Court sidestepped this issue entirely (§ 431).
This approach is rooted in Hassan v. United Kingdom, in which the Court emphasized that, absent a formal derogation, the Convention applies to State acts during armed conflict. (§ 104). However, in Hassan, the Court highlighted that Article 5 will be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant provisions of IHL only where this is specifically pleaded by the Respondent. (§ 107). In Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, the respondent did not participate at the merits stage and thus did not specifically plead IHL as a modifying lens. Despite this, the Grand Chamber extensively relied on IHL principles to interpret and apply Article 2, reflecting both the scale of the conflict and the necessity of engaging with IHL in any modern armed conflict scenario.
Furthermore, citing Varnava and Others v. Turkey (§ 185), the Court highlighted that the Convention, in any case, should be interpreted in harmony with general principles of international law, including IHL rules (§ 106). In this sense, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia may mark a shift towards a more proactive integration of IHL in the Convention analysis, especially in large-scale armed conflicts where States might refuse to participate or plead narrowly.
The Court states that all acts and omissions of the Russian armed forces are attributable to Russia as acts of State organs (§ 362). As for the “separatist” entities in Donetsk and Luhansk, the Court draws directly from its earlier admissibility findings, observing that their operations were “completely dependent on military, political and economic support” from Russia (§§ 363-4) and therefore attributable to them. Applying Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), the Court finds that from 11 May 2014 onward, the separatists should be treated as de facto organs of Russia. The status was maintained until Russia’s withdrawal from the Convention in September 2022 (§§ 365-6).
Equally important, the Court carefully separates the question of attribution (who and on whose behalf did it) from that of jurisdiction (do the victims fall within Russia’s responsibility under Article 1?). The Grand Chamber finds both conditions satisfied: the acts of Russian forces and separatists are attributable to Russia, and, due to Russia’s control, the victims of those acts fall within the Convention’s protective scope. In practical terms, this means that whether it is a Russian officer or a separatist fighter who gave the order to down MH17, or who pressed the button to fire the missile, Russia is accountable under the European Convention.
Neither Ukraine nor the Netherlands asked the Court to rule on the legality of Russia’s use of force as such. Without such submissions, and given its institutional limits, the Court holds back from incorporating Charter violations directly into its Convention analysis (§ 431).
This approach is both pragmatic and elegant. The ECtHR’s mandate is to determine whether Convention rights were breached. A violation of jus ad bellum does not automatically entail a breach of human rights law, nor does every breach of the Convention depend on the lawfulness of force under the Charter. By drawing this line, the Court keeps its focus on individual rights.
This judgment will inevitably guide the processing of the remaining Ukraine-Russia docket on Crimea (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)) as well as other proceedings, such as the Armenia v. Azerbaijan filings.
While Strasbourg speaks the language of state responsibility for human-rights breaches, its findings are also likely to serve as important reference points for the ICC’s criminal investigations into alleged war crimes in Ukraine (Situation in Ukraine) and the ICJ’s proceedings (for example, the Genocide Convention case filed by Ukraine). The Grand Chamber’s confirmation that Russia exercised effective control over Donbas from May 2014 feeds directly into any future reparations calculus. Anyone seeking redress for injuries or losses suffered during this period will be able to point to the ECtHR’s judgment as authoritative evidence that Russia bore legal responsibility.
In the end, this judgment might well become the ECtHR’s own “Nicaragua moment,” a turning point where the Court shows it is ready to grapple with patterns of violence and proxy warfare at Europe’s doorstep, and to shape the law for years to come. Much like the ICJ’s Nicaragua decision left a deep and lasting mark on international law by engaging with the realities of contemporary conflict, the Grand Chamber’s ruling has the potential to redefine how European human rights law responds to the shifting landscape of armed conflict, occupation, and state responsibility. Many aspects of the judgment are hence sure to receive separate analysis and application by commentators, adjudicators, and policymakers alike.
Strasbourg Observers is an academic blog that discusses recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. The editorial team of Strasbourg Observers is based at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University and the Centre for Government and Law of Hasselt University.
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