August 20, 2025
By Dr. Ufuk Yeşil
On July 8 2025, the European Court of Human Rights’ (the ECtHR or the Court) addressed violations stemming from the prolonged detention of Selahattin Demirtaş, the former HDP co-chair, in Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (No. 4), exposing systemic judicial abuses targeting political dissent in Türkiye. This blog post analyzes this judgment, and connects it to the earlier 2020 Demirtaş (No. 2) [GC] ruling on which it builds – evaluating their combined implications for human rights, judicial reform, and democratic governance. Overall, the judgment emphasizes Türkiye’s ongoing non-compliance with mandates for judicial independence and pluralism.
Selahattin Demirtaş, born in 1973, is a central figure in Turkish politics, serving as a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly from 2007 to 2018 and co-chair of the HDP, a left-leaning party advocating for Kurdish rights, gender equality, and democratic reforms. His detention, initiated on November 4, 2016, and followed by a second pre-trial detention on September 20, 2019, stemmed from allegations linked to the violent Kobanê protests of October 6-8, 2014. These protests erupted in response to the Islamic State (ISIS) siege of Kobanê, a Kurdish-majority city in Syria, amid widespread frustration with the Turkish government’s perceived inaction and restrictive policies toward Kurdish communities. The authorities accused Demirtaş and other HDP leaders of inciting violence through social media posts, particularly tweets issued by the HDP’s central executive committee, and public statements calling for protests. The Demirtaş (No. 4) case focuses on the second detention, ordered shortly after a domestic court’s release decision in September 2019, raising concerns about the misuse of judicial processes to prolong his incarceration and circumvent the ECtHR’s 2020 ruling.
The Grand Chamber’s 2020 ruling in Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (No. 2) addressed Demirtaş’s initial detention, finding violations of several Convention provisions due to the lack of legal and evidential basis for his detention. The ECtHR determined that the detention violated Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security), as the evidence—primarily political speeches and HDP tweets—did not provide reasonable suspicion of terrorism-related offenses, such as membership in an armed terrorist organization or incitement to violence. The Court criticized the broad interpretation of terrorism laws under Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which failed to meet the foreseeability requirement under Article 10 (freedom of expression). The 2016 constitutional amendment lifting parliamentary immunity was deemed unforeseeable and a misuse of constitutional procedures, as it undermined protections for political speech. The Court also found a violation of Article 5 § 3, noting that the prolonged detention lacked sufficient justification and failed to consider alternatives, such as judicial review measures. Under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections), the Court ruled that Demirtaş’s detention prevented his participation in parliamentary activities, infringing on his elected role. Most critically, the violation of Article 18 (in conjunction with Article 5) demonstrates that the detention was motivated by an ulterior purpose: to suppress pluralism and restrict political debate, a conclusion supported by contextual evidence of targeted actions against opposition figures and public statements from high-ranking officials indicating political interference. The Court ordered Demirtaş’s immediate release, emphasizing Türkiye’s obligation under Article 46 to comply.
The Demirtaş (No. 4) judgment reinforces the 2020 findings, addressing the second detention and identifying systemic judicial abuses. The ECtHR’s key findings include:
The Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1(c), which requires reasonable suspicion for deprivation of liberty. The accusations against Demirtaş, including undermining state unity, inciting violence, and terrorism-related activities, relied on the same 2014 Kobanê events examined in Demirtaş (No. 2). The ECtHR determined that the tweets and speeches attributed to Demirtaş constituted protected political expression, lacking any explicit or implicit incitement to violence. The timing of the re-detention—immediately following a release order on September 20, 2019—and the re-framing of charges without new evidence suggested an attempt to circumvent the 2020 judgment. This undermined the principles of legality and fairness, reinforcing concerns about autocratic legalism, where judicial processes are manipulated to achieve political ends.
Under Article 5 § 3, the ECtHR assessed the proportionality of Demirtaş’s detention, which exceeded four years. The Court found that the Turkish authorities failed to justify detention as a measure of last resort, neglecting alternatives like judicial review measures or bail, as required by Turkish law and the Convention. The prolonged detention, particularly given Demirtaş’s status as a prominent opposition leader, was deemed disproportionate and a potential tool to silence dissent, echoing the 2020 ruling’s concerns about the misuse of pre-trial detention to suppress political activity.
The ECtHR identified two violations of Article 5 § 4. First, the Turkish Constitutional Court’s four-year delay in reviewing Demirtaş’s detention was incompatible with the requirement of a “speedy” review, rendering the remedy ineffective. Second, restrictions on Demirtaş’s access to the case file, imposed without compelling justification, hindered his ability to challenge the detention. These procedural deficiencies, consistent with the 2020 judgment’s findings, highlight systemic issues in Türkiye’s judicial system, including inadequate access to justice and lack of transparency.
The ECtHR’s most significant finding was the violation of Article 18, concluding that Demirtaş’s detention pursued an ulterior motive of stifling pluralism and restricting political debate. This conclusion was supported by numerous reports, the timing of his re-detention, the absence of credible evidence regarding the alleged criminal conduct, and public statements made by high-ranking officials, including the President, which undermined the presumption of innocence and pointed to executive interference. These concerns had already been raised in the Court’s 2020 judgment.
These findings align with the 2020 judgment’s Article 18 violation, underscoring Türkiye’s persistent use of judicial processes to suppress opposition voices.
The Demirtaş (No. 4) ruling is directly linked to the 2020 judgment, as it addresses Türkiye’s failure to comply with the Grand Chamber’s order for Demirtaş’s immediate release. Both cases center on the 2014 Kobanê protests, with the authorities relying on similar evidence—HDP tweets and political speeches—to justify detention. The 2020 ruling established that Demirtaş’s initial detention was unlawful, politically motivated, and aimed at undermining democratic pluralism, particularly through the misuse of terrorism laws and the 2016 constitutional amendment. The re-detention in 2019, based on re-framed charges without new evidence, represents a clear defiance of the ECtHR’s authority and a continuation of the violations identified in 2020. This pattern of re-detention, as noted by Ezgi Yildiz, exemplifies “autocratic legalism,” where legal mechanisms are manipulated to achieve political objectives, such as neutralizing opposition leaders like Demirtaş, who played a pivotal role in advancing Kurdish representation. The ECtHR’s findings in Demirtaş (No. 4) reinforce the 2020 judgment’s conclusions, highlighting Türkiye’s systemic failure to address judicial independence and comply with international human rights obligations.
Judge Saadet Yüksel, who had also dissented in previous Demirtaş cases, argued that the Court’s findings were premature, as domestic proceedings regarding the Kobanê events were ongoing. Citing the principle of subsidiarity, Yüksel emphasized deference to national courts, which she believed should be allowed to complete their evaluations. She cautioned that the Article 18 finding risked overstepping the ECtHR’s role, given the high evidentiary threshold required to establish ulterior motives. Yüksel’s dissent in Demirtaş (No. 2) similarly argued that the Constitutional Court’s 2020 finding of a violation under Article 19 of the Turkish Constitution (equivalent to Article 5 § 3) and the awarded compensation constituted sufficient redress, negating Demirtaş’s victim status. Her dissent highlights the tension between international oversight and domestic judicial autonomy, a recurring issue in ECtHR cases involving Türkiye.
The Demirtaş (No. 4) judgment, building on the 2020 ruling, carries profound implications for human rights, judicial independence, and democratic governance. The following analysis highlights the ruling’s core findings and supports the arguments specific to the 2025 ruling, addressing its significance in countering political repression and fostering global human rights standards.
The Demirtaş (No. 4) ruling exposes Türkiye’s deepening democratic backsliding, characterized by the systematic targeting of opposition figures, particularly from the HDP, through judicial harassment. The ECtHR’s findings align with the Venice Commission’s 2017 concerns about the erosion of judicial independence and the misuse of vague terrorism laws to criminalize dissent. The re-detention of Demirtaş, despite the 2020 ruling, exemplifies a deliberate strategy to marginalize pro-Kurdish voices, as seen in the ongoing HDP closure case and the detention of other opposition leaders, such as Osman Kavala (Kavala v. Türkiye). This creates a chilling effect, deterring political participation and undermining democratic debate, particularly for Türkiye’s Kurdish minority, which constitutes approximately 15-20% of the population. The ECtHR’s emphasis on Article 18 violations underscores the need for structural reforms to restore judicial impartiality, protect minority representation, and strengthen checks and balances. By highlighting executive interference—evidenced by public statements from high-ranking officials—the ruling calls for accountability mechanisms to curb the politicization of judicial processes, critical to reversing democratic erosion.
Türkiye’s failure to implement the 2020 order for Demirtaş’s release, followed by his re-detention, poses a direct challenge to the ECtHR’s authority and the Council of Europe’s enforcement mechanisms. Public statements by Turkish officials, including the President’s dismissal of ECtHR rulings as non-binding, exacerbate this issue. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has repeatedly urged Türkiye to address systemic issues, such as prolonged pre-trial detention and executive influence over the judiciary, but progress remains limited. The Demirtaş (No. 4) ruling strengthens calls for robust enforcement measures, including diplomatic pressure, public reporting, and, in extreme cases, sanctions like suspension of Türkiye’s voting rights in the Council of Europe. Such measures are essential to uphold the integrity of the European human rights system and deter other member states from similar non-compliance. The ruling also highlights the need for enhanced dialogue between the ECtHR and national authorities to facilitate compliance, potentially through capacity-building programs for judges and prosecutors.
The Demirtaş (No. 4) judgment provides a robust framework for addressing politically motivated prosecutions worldwide, contributing to the global fight against authoritarianism. The ECtHR’s rigorous application of Article 18, supported by contextual analysis, temporal proximity, and review of the evidence, offers a model for scrutinizing judicial abuses in states where courts are co-opted to suppress dissent, as seen in cases like Navalnyy v. Russia. This precedent is particularly relevant in regions experiencing democratic backsliding, such as Poland, Hungary, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia, where opposition leaders face targeted prosecutions. The ruling’s methodology—combining evidence of ulterior motives with systemic patterns—empowers international human rights organizations to advocate for stronger protections for political pluralism. By setting benchmarks for judicial independence and democratic governance, Demirtaş (No. 4) encourages global courts and mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to adopt similar approaches, reinforcing the rule of law in repressive contexts.
The findings in Demirtaş (No. 4) underscore systemic judicial deficiencies, including prolonged pre-trial detention, delayed reviews, and restricted access to case files. Comprehensive reforms are needed to insulate judges and prosecutors from political pressure through merit-based appointments, impartial oversight by bodies like the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, and transparent judicial proceedings. Accountability for executive interference, particularly through public statements undermining judicial impartiality, is critical to rebuilding public trust. The case also highlights the role of a free media in exposing judicial abuses and fostering public discourse. In Türkiye, where journalists face prosecution for covering sensitive cases (Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Türkiye, Şahin Alpay v. Türkiye), strengthening media independence through legal protections and international support is essential. These reforms are vital to counter autocratic legalism, ensure compliance with Convention standards, and amplify civil society voices in defending democratic principles.
The sustained targeting of Demirtaş and the HDP is emblematic of a broader pattern of state-driven marginalization of minorities, most notably the Kurdish population in Turkey. The ECtHR’s judgments underscore that the protection of minority rights and the promotion of authentic political pluralism are not merely democratic ideals, but essential prerequisites for a stable and inclusive society. Ensuring meaningful minority participation in political life requires comprehensive legislative and policy reforms—such as lowering or recalibrating electoral thresholds, removing structural barriers to representation, and guaranteeing equal access to political processes. Only through such measures can the persistent exclusion and disenfranchisement of vulnerable groups be effectively addressed, thereby reinforcing the foundations of democratic governance and social cohesion. The Demirtaş judgments thus serve as a clarion call for Turkey and other states to embrace a more inclusive and pluralistic vision of democracy, where diversity is not only tolerated but actively protected and valued.
The Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (No. 4) judgment, in conjunction with the 2020 Demirtaş (No. 2) ruling, exposes the systemic misuse of judicial processes to suppress political dissent in Türkiye. By identifying violations of Articles 5 and 18, the ECtHR reaffirms its commitment to safeguarding political freedoms and curbing autocratic legalism. Türkiye’s non-compliance with the 2020 order, evidenced by Demirtaş’s re-detention, highlights persistent challenges to judicial independence and democratic pluralism. Judge Yüksel’s dissent underscores the tension between international oversight and domestic judicial autonomy, but the ECtHR’s findings emphasize the urgent need for judicial reform, respect for international human rights obligations, and protection of minority voices. Globally, Demirtaş (No. 4) serves as a beacon for addressing politically motivated prosecutions, offering a framework for international courts and organizations to uphold the rule of law and democratic principles in repressive contexts. Meaningful reforms in Türkiye, including judicial independence, media freedom, and minority inclusion, are essential to restore public trust and align with Convention standards.
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