September 26, 2025
by Gvantsa Danelia
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently delivered its judgment in Matchavariani v. Georgia (Application no. 46852/21). At first glance, the case might seem like another routine finding of a violation in an administrative detention case. However, a closer examination reveals a subtle yet crucial message from Strasbourg, particularly concerning a systemic deficiency within Georgian administrative justice: the persistent refusal of national courts to genuinely assess the necessity of detention in protest-related arrests, effectively treating such critical reviews as beyond their purview. This judicial abdication formed the core of the ECtHR’s Article 5 § 1 finding, sending an important signal for the adjudication of protest-related cases, especially in the context of hybrid democracies, in which democratic institutions operate largely as a facade, lacking the substantive power to uphold the rule of law or protect citizens’ rights from state overreach. Beyond this, the judgment also warrants a critical look at the Court’s approach under Articles 10 and 11, and its specific framing of certain fair trial complaints under Article 6, where its analysis arguably downplays key procedural principles – stances that risk inadvertently enabling administrative overreach. This post will delve into these facets of the Matchavariani judgment, exploring its deeper implications for human rights protection in Georgia.
The case of Matchavariani v. Georgia originated from the applicant’s – Mr Aleksi Matchavariani, a civil society activist and founding member of the NGO ‘Shame Movement’ – attempt to participate in a demonstration on the evening of 9 November 2020 in Tbilisi. The demonstration was organised to denounce a recently imposed COVID-19 curfew as unfair, particularly in light of ongoing political protests against the outcome of the parliamentary elections held on 31 October 2020.
Mr Matchavariani attempted to bring several pieces of firewood to the demonstration, which was planned as a vigil near the Parliament building. He was stopped by police officers who informed him that firewood was not permitted. A verbal altercation ensued with V.S., the head of the Patrol Police Department, during which V.S. stated that firewood had been misused in the past to attack police and that Mr Matchavariani risked arrest if he did not comply. Mr Matchavariani insisted the order was unlawful and that he would not obey it. After the applicant uttered, ‘We will break you’, and then clarified, ‘We will break this government’, V.S. ordered his arrest. The applicant was arrested at 9.27 p.m. for disobeying lawful orders of the police, an offence under Article 173 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). He was then transferred to a police station and subsequently to a temporary detention facility.
On 10 November 2020, the Tbilisi City Court found Mr Matchavariani guilty under Article 173 of the CAO and imposed an administrative fine of GEL 1,000 (approx. EUR 255 at the time). He was released from detention following the judgment. Crucially, when the applicant requested release from detention during the hearing, the trial court dismissed the request, stating it ‘could not assess the lawfulness of his detention… but only whether the time-limit provided in Article 247 of the CAO… had been complied with’. The court noted that ‘a detained individual was required to remain in detention while the administrative-offence proceedings were pending, and that a court could order his or her release only if the maximum time-limit of forty-eight hours… had been reached’. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal later upheld this decision, reasoning that the maximum detention period had not expired and that the detention ‘had been aimed at ensuring the implementation of any such potential sanction in his case’.
In his application to the ECtHR, Mr. Matchavariani alleged several violations of the Convention. He argued under Article 5 that his arrest and detention had been arbitrary and unlawful. Under Articles 10 and 11, he complained that his arrest and conviction for an administrative offence constituted an unjustified interference with his rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Finally, concerning Article 6, he alleged that the trial court had violated the principles of equality of arms and objective impartiality by actively aiding the police in substantiating their case against him.
The Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The central pillar of this finding was the inadequacy of the domestic judicial review of the applicant’s detention. The ECtHR reiterated that for deprivation of liberty to be considered free from arbitrariness, ‘it does not suffice that this measure is executed in conformity with national law; it must also be necessary in the circumstances’ (para. 60).
In Matchavariani, the Court observed that the Tbilisi City Court explicitly ‘found that it lacked the jurisdiction to order the applicant’s release while the administrative-offence proceedings were pending’ beyond checking the 48-hour time limit (para. 63, referencing domestic court proceedings at para. 22). Regarding the Court of Appeal’s justification that detention aimed to ensure a potential custodial sanction, the ECtHR emphasised that ‘a mere reference to the application of a custodial sanction, especially in the context of administrative-offence proceedings involving the applicant’s non-violent conduct related to his participation in a demonstration cannot be a sufficient justification for the application of pre-trial detention which, in any event, ought to be resorted to in exceptional circumstances’ (para. 65).
The ECtHR was critical of an interpretation that would deem any pre-trial detention justified if it fell within maximum time limits, stating this ‘would be incompatible with the Court’s case-law on the matter’ – relying on foundational Grand Chamber precedents, including S., V. and A. v. Denmark, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, and Denis and Irvine v. Belgium, which establish that any detention must always be ‘necessary in the circumstances’ (paras. 60, 64). Ultimately, the Court concluded that ‘the domestic courts’ judgments did not contain an individual assessment, balancing relevant arguments for and against release, of whether the detention – which had lasted for over twenty-two hours – had been a proportionate measure of last resort in the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case’ (para. 66). Therefore, the applicant’s detention ‘was not free from arbitrariness in that the authorities had failed to show that the applicant’s detention had been necessary in the circumstances’ (para. 67).
The applicant complained that the trial judge actively aided the police in substantiating their case, thereby breaching the principle of equality of arms and objective impartiality. The ECtHR chose to examine this complaint ‘only from the perspective of the impartiality requirement’ (para. 69). It found no violation of Article 6 § 1 on this account. The Court noted that domestic law (Article 4 of the Code of Administrative Procedure) allowed a court to require parties to present additional evidence. Since the police acted as a prosecuting authority and the applicant could comment on the evidence, the judge’s intervention (requesting evidence on the past misuse of firewood, a matter allegedly of ‘public knowledge’) did not raise legitimate doubts about objective impartiality (paras. 88, 91). The Court also referenced Jussila v. Finland, suggesting that Article 6 guarantees might not apply with full stringency in all ‘criminal head’ cases (para. 88).
Regarding the applicant’s complaints under Articles 10 and 11, the Court declared them ‘manifestly ill-founded’ and thus inadmissible (para. 98). The ECtHR’s reasoning was that the applicant’s ‘explicit refusal to comply with the order not to take firewood to a demonstration cannot enjoy the same privileged protection under the Convention as political speech or debate on questions of public interest or the peaceful manifestation of opinions on such matters’ (para. 96). The Court underlined that the applicant ‘would have been able to express his disapproval of the government’s imposition of the curfew had he complied with the instruction of the police not to take firewood with him’ (para. 96).
Furthermore, the Court noted that ‘the domestic courts duly addressed the necessity of finding a balance between protecting the applicant’s rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and the rights of others in the context of a risk that the firewood carried by the applicant could present in the circumstances’ (para. 97). It also found the sanction proportionate, as the domestic courts imposed ‘the least severe sanction provided for by law: an administrative fine’ (para. 97). Consequently, the ECtHR held that ‘the domestic authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation by sanctioning the applicant for disobeying the lawful orders of the police’ (para. 97).
The Matchavariani judgment, while perhaps not a landmark ruling in its jurisprudential novelty, carries significant weight when contextualised within the Georgian legal landscape and the broader challenges faced by hybrid democracies in upholding fundamental freedoms.
The ECtHR’s condemnation of the domestic courts’ superficial review under Article 5 § 1 is the most resonant aspect of this judgment for Georgia. It points directly to a deep-seated, systemic issue: the judiciary’s reluctance to act as a genuine check on executive power in cases of administrative detention, particularly those arising from protests. As argued in the introduction, national courts often limit their scrutiny to the formal lawfulness of an arrest, such as whether a police officer issued a ‘lawful order’. However, they consistently sidestep the more substantive question of whether detention itself is a necessary and proportionate measure in the specific circumstances, especially when less restrictive alternatives might be available.
The Tbilisi City Court’s assertion that it ‘could not assess the lawfulness of his detention’ beyond time limits (para. 22 of facts, cited by ECtHR at para. 63) and the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the unexpired maximum detention period and the aim of ensuring a potential sanction (para. 33 of facts, cited by ECtHR at paras. 64, 65) are emblematic of this. This practice transforms judicial review into a mere rubber-stamping exercise, providing a veneer of legality to what can be arbitrary deprivations of liberty. The ECtHR’s explicit statement in Matchavariani that such a circumscribed review, particularly an interpretation where detention is ‘normally regarded as lawful during the initial forty-eight hours’ (para. 64), is ‘incompatible with the Court’s case-law’ (para. 64), is a clear directive. It underscores that judicial bodies must independently and thoroughly assess the arguments concerning the necessity of the detention itself, considering the individual circumstances, the nature of the alleged offence, and the impact of detention on the individual, especially in the context of exercising Convention rights. For Georgia, this necessitates a paradigm shift in judicial practice, moving away from deference to police narratives and towards a robust engagement with the fundamental right to liberty. The implications extend beyond Georgia; in many hybrid democracies, similar patterns of judicial passivity in the face of administrative actions against dissenters can be observed. This trend is evident in numerous ECtHR judgments. For example, in Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, the Court found a violation of Article 5 where the domestic court showed ‘negligence in reviewing both the factual and the legal basis for the applicants’ detention’. Similarly, in Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, the Court found that detaining protesters without a genuine, individualized assessment of necessity violated the Convention. This makes the Matchavariani judgment a valuable and timely reference point for rights defenders across the region.
While the Article 5 finding is a welcome clarification, the Court’s handling of Articles 10 and 11 in Matchavariani warrants a more critical discussion. The Court’s conclusion that the applicant’s ‘explicit refusal to comply with the order not to take firewood… cannot enjoy the same privileged protection… as political speech’ (para. 96) and its deference to the domestic courts’ balancing exercise and the proportionality of the fine (para. 97) seem to underplay the expressive conduct inherent in protest actions.
While maintaining public order is a legitimate aim, there is a risk that an overly deferential approach by the ECtHR to State justifications can inadvertently embolden authorities to impose undue restrictions on peaceful assembly and expression. The Court’s emphasis that Mr Matchavariani ‘would have been able to express his disapproval… had he complied’ (para. 96) simplifies the multifaceted nature of protest, where the manner of expression can be as important as the message itself. Protest actions, even those involving minor disruptions or symbolic transgressions intended to convey a message (like bringing firewood for a vigil in defiance of a contested curfew), are a vital form of political expression. If the Court consistently downplays this symbolic dimension and readily accepts broad public order justifications without a more searching scrutiny of their application and chilling effect, it may narrow the recognized scope of protection under Articles 10 and 11. This is particularly concerning in hybrid regimes where ‘public order’ can be, and often is, invoked expansively to curtail legitimate dissent. The Matchavariani judgment, in this regard, perhaps represents a missed opportunity to send a stronger signal against the administrative overreach that can suppress expressive acts forming part of a protest.
Beyond the findings on detention and freedom of expression, the Court’s treatment of the applicant’s fair trial complaint concerning the judge’s conduct also merits attention. The applicant argued that the trial judge actively assisted the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (the ‘MIA’) representative in substantiating the accusation by insisting they provide video evidence of past firewood misuse, thereby breaching the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings – cornerstones of the Georgian justice system (as detailed in his domestic appeal (para. 30) and his ECtHR complaint (para. 69).
The ECtHR, however, opted to examine this judicial intervention ‘only from the perspective of the impartiality requirement’ (para. 69). While acknowledging the judge’s proactive role in seeking evidence (para. 21, para. 89), the Court found no violation of objective impartiality. It reasoned that domestic law allowed judges to request additional evidence (para. 88), a prosecuting authority was present (para. 87), the applicant could comment on the evidence (para. 91), and the issue concerned ‘public knowledge’ (para. 91).
This approach, however, raises questions about whether the distinct principle of ‘equality of arms’ was adequately addressed. In an adversarial system, the judge’s primary role is that of a neutral arbiter. Actively directing the prosecution to furnish evidence essential for their case, particularly when the prosecution initially indicated it would be ‘unreasonably time-consuming’ (para. 21), could be perceived as stepping into the prosecutorial arena, thereby upsetting the procedural balance. While not necessarily indicative of bias, such intervention might disadvantage the defence. The Court’s reliance on Jussila v. Finland to suggest a potentially less stringent application of Article 6 guarantees in administrative offence cases (para. 88) also warrants careful consideration, given that these cases can involve significant penalties like detention (as Article 173 CAO allows) and arise in politically charged contexts. If the ECtHR tends to subsume such equality of arms issues under the broader umbrella of ‘impartiality’, especially in ‘minor’ criminal or administrative cases, it might risk diluting the protection afforded by one of the core tenets of a fair trial.
Matchavariani v. Georgia may not make headlines for dramatic legal shifts, but its importance lies in its reinforcement of fundamental principles and its subtle critique of domestic judicial failings. The ECtHR’s clear stance on the necessity of a thorough judicial review for any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 is a crucial reminder for the Georgian judiciary to step up to its responsibility as a guardian of fundamental rights, especially when administrative powers are deployed in the sensitive context of public protests. The finding that domestic courts failed ‘to show that the applicant’s detention had been necessary in the circumstances’ (para. 67) should resonate deeply.
However, the judgment also serves as a point of reflection on the ECtHR’s own balancing act under Articles 10 and 11, and its analytical framework for certain Article 6 complaints. While the State’s interest in maintaining public order is undeniable, the Court must remain vigilant against the risk of these justifications being used as a pretext to stifle dissent. Similarly, ensuring robust procedural fairness, including the critical principle of equality of arms, is paramount, even in administrative offence proceedings. For Georgia, and indeed for other nations navigating the complexities of democratic consolidation, Matchavariani should be read as an encouragement for more rights-protective domestic adjudication and a prompt for ongoing dialogue about the scope of legitimate protest and fair trial guarantees in a democratic society. The quiet signals from Strasbourg often carry the most profound implications for the day-to-day protection of human rights on the ground.
Strasbourg Observers is an academic blog that discusses recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. The editorial team of Strasbourg Observers is based at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University and the Centre for Government and Law of Hasselt University.
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