October 21, 2025
By Dr. Ufuk Yeşil
On July 22, 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in Demirhan and Others v. Türkiye (Demirhan), addressing the convictions of 239 Turkish nationals for alleged membership in the Gülen movement, primarily based on their alleged use of the encrypted messaging application ByLock. Building on the landmark Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [Grand Chamber] (Yalçınkaya) ruling of 2023, this judgment reaffirms violations of Articles 7 (no punishment without law) and 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ruling exposes systemic judicial deficiencies in Türkiye’s handling of Gülen movement-related prosecutions, highlighting the misuse of judicial processes to criminalize a group of people. However, the ECtHR’s refusal to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage or costs and expenses raises serious concerns about the adequacy of redress for victims of systemic human rights violations. This analysis examines the Demirhan judgment, its connection to Yalçınkaya, critiques the ECtHR’s approach to just satisfaction, and evaluates the broader implications for human rights.
The Demirhan case involves 239 applicants convicted under Article 314 § 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code for membership in the Gülen movement, an organization described as an armed terrorist organisation and blamed by Turkish authorities for the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. The convictions relied heavily on the applicants’ alleged use of ByLock, which domestic courts characterized as an exclusive communication tool of Gülen movement members. Additional evidence, where present, included affiliations with Gülen-linked institutions, bank activities, or social media posts, but ByLock remained the cornerstone of the prosecutions. Investigated post-coup, the applicants faced trials marred by systemic issues, including the inability to challenge ByLock evidence effectively and the courts’ expansive interpretation of terrorism laws. Their applications to the Turkish Constitutional Court were summarily dismissed, leading them to seek redress before the ECtHR.
The Grand Chamber ruling in Yalçınkaya in 2023 set a critical precedent for Gülen movement-related cases, finding violations of Articles 7 and 6§1 due to the applicant’s conviction based primarily on ByLock use. The ECtHR held that equating ByLock use with knowing and willing membership in an armed terrorist organization lacked foreseeability and constituted an overly broad interpretation of Article 314, violating the principle of legality under Article 7. The Court criticized the failure to establish the offense’s material and mental elements individually, noting that ByLock use was not part of the actus reus but was treated as conclusive proof of guilt. Under Article 6§1, the Court identified procedural flaws, including the applicant’s inability to challenge ByLock evidence and the courts’ inadequate reasoning about its organizational role. The judgment ordered the reopening of domestic proceedings, highlighted the systemic nature of the violations—with over 8,000 similar applications pending—and costs and expenses were awarded, deeming the finding of violations sufficient for non-pecuniary damage.
The Demirhan judgment reinforces Yalçınkaya, addressing the convictions of 239 applicants and identifying systemic judicial abuses. Key findings include:
The ECtHR found that Turkish courts’ practice of treating ByLock use as conclusive evidence of Gülen movement membership was arbitrary and lacked foreseeability. The Court emphasized that the mental element (intent) of the offense was not assessed individually, leading to an automatic presumption of guilt. This approach violated the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege, undermining the requirement for individualized culpability. The criminalization of lawful acts, such as using an encrypted messaging application, was deemed incompatible with the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty. The Court underlined that treating ByLock use as sufficient evidence of organizational membership eliminated the need for individualized assessment, resulting in automatic convictions and undermining the very foundation of criminal justice.
The judgment highlighted that the uniform and unreasoned reliance on ByLock evidence deprived applicants of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them. The ECtHR found that the judicial process was superficial and automatic, with insufficient reasoning and a lack of transparency. Restricted access to ByLock data, the absence of independent verification of the evidence’s integrity, and the failure to provide adequate reasoning for convictions all contributed to a serious violation of the right to a fair trial. The Court’s findings underscore the erosion of procedural safeguards and the undermining of defence rights in the Turkish judicial system. The lack of technical analysis of ByLock’s features and the presumption of organizational affiliation without concrete evidence further demonstrate the lack of objectivity in the judicial process.
The ECHR stressed that these violations were not isolated incidents but reflected a systemic problem affecting thousands of individuals. The Court noted that over 5,000 similar applications had been communicated to Turkey, with thousands more pending, highlighting the urgent need for restoring the systemic problem. Despite the Grand Chamber’s guidance in Yalçınkaya, the Demirhan judgment exposes a persistent pattern of abuse within the Turkish judiciary, where political pressure instrumentalizes judicial processes to suppress dissent and target specific groups, fundamentally undermining the rule of law.
Judge Saadet Yüksel, maintaining the legal views expressed in her dissenting opinions annexed to the Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye judgment (15669/20), upon which the present judgment largely relies, respectfully disagrees with the finding of a violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention in the present case and thus partially dissents from the decision.
Demirhan extends the findings of Yalçınkaya, confirming that the systemic issues identified in the earlier case remain unaddressed. Both cases center on the misuse of ByLock evidence, the failure to assess individual guilt, and the instrumentalization of judicial processes to suppress dissent. The high number of applicants in Demirhan judgment demonstrates the need for the ECtHR to adopt more effective and deterrent measures in the face of persistent systemic violations. The continued disregard for the Grand Chamber’s guidance in Yalçınkaya by the Turkish judiciary, in a clear breach of Article 46 of the Convention, exemplifies the phenomenon of autocratic legalism, where domestic legal institutions are manipulated to serve political ends. This systemic disregard, thus, functions not merely as judicial inertia, but as a deliberate mechanism to shield the government’s narrative and consolidate its political agenda.
The ECtHR’s findings in Demirhan are crucial in once again exposing systemic judicial abuses; however, the Court’s failure to grant adequate just satisfaction under Article 41 remains notably concerning. The Court refused to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage or costs and expenses, citing its practice in repetitive cases and noting that the 239 applications were processed as standardized complaints post-Yalçınkaya. This stance is problematic.
First, the refusal to award costs and expenses disregards the applicants’ significant legal and financial burdens. Lodged before Yalçınkaya’s 2023 precedent—some predating it—these applications required navigating complex proceedings in an uncertain legal landscape. Unlike Alekseyev and Others v. Russia (nos. 14988/09 and 50 others, 27 November 2018) or Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom (nos. 47784/09 and 9 others, 12 August 2014), which followed established precedents, Demirhan and the other applicants acted without such clarity, necessitating legal assistance. Yalçınkaya’s award of costs recognized this, making Demirhan’s denial inconsistent. This risks deterring future applicants in systemic violation cases.
The partly dissenting opinion of Judge Schembri Orland, joined by Judges Pastor Vilanova and Šimáčková in Yalçınkaya, supports this critique, arguing that the applicants’ efforts warranted reimbursement of costs. Case law like Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC] (nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 229-30, ECHR 2009) suggests legal costs for systemic violations are “necessarily incurred” and compensable. By prioritizing efficiency over redress, the ECtHR undermines access to justice, particularly in Türkiye, where thousands of ByLock-related applications signal systemic issues. Awarding costs would have reinforced victim support and incentivized reforms.
Second, the decision to deem the finding of violations sufficient as non-pecuniary damage—such as emotional distress, reputational harm, and loss of liberty—undermines effective redress. The applicants, many enduring prolonged detention and social stigmatization, suffered tangible harm unaddressed by a mere declaration. The scale of Demirhan and 239 other applicants amplifies the need for compensation, unlike Yalçınkaya, where costs were awarded but not damages. Even though the Court awarded costs in Yalçınkaya, its reliance on reopening domestic proceedings was misguided, as it effectively enabled the Turkish courts to re-prosecute and reconvict. Given the Constitutional Court’s consistent dismissals and Türkiye’s broader record of non-compliance, such a good-faith approach has now lost its validity.
Building upon the Yalçınkaya judgment, the Demirhan ruling reaffirms the ECtHR’s commitment to the protection of human rights, judicial independence, and democratic governance in Türkiye. Building on Yalçınkaya, the Demirhan judgment carries profound implications for human rights, judicial independence, and democratic governance in Türkiye. It reveals systemic legal deficiencies and raises concerns about potential crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the judgment aligns with international findings on arbitrary detention while underscoring Türkiye’s persistent non-compliance with the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. Demirhan, ultimately, calls for comprehensive structural reforms to restore judicial independence and the rule of law.
Demirhan reveals Türkiye’s deepening democratic backsliding, with terrorism laws misused to criminalize the Gülen movement. Systemic reliance on ByLock evidence, without individualized assessments, reflects judicial harassment of perceived state opponents. Aligning with the Venice Commission’s concerns about judicial independence erosion and vague terrorism laws, the ECtHR’s findings demand structural reforms to restore impartiality, protect rights, and strengthen democratic checks.
The European Court of Human Rights, for the first time in its 64-year history, has identified 239 violations of Article 7 in a single case, thereby revealing the seriousness and exceptional scale of judicial practices in Turkey. In contrast, until now, the Court had found only 63 violations of Article 7 in total. The judgments delivered by various Turkish courts against 239 individuals collectively represent a profound breach of the principle of legality and point to a structural problem that goes far beyond isolated incidents. These convictions, which resulted in the deprivation of liberty for all applicants, may constitute an example of the crime of systematic and arbitrary deprivation of liberty directed at a specific group, as defined in Article 77/1(c) of the Turkish Penal Code and recognized as a ‘crime against humanity.’ Although the ECtHR remains formally neutral regarding the underlying motivation behind these systemic convictions, its findings demonstrate that convictions lacking individualized evidence reflect a deliberate and systematic policy by the state to collectively punish a group perceived as a threat, and this situation also aligns with the definition of crimes against humanity. This pattern of systemic violation is further corroborated by the ECtHR’s ongoing review of more than 5,000 ByLock-related applications and thousands of additional pending cases.
The Demirhan judgment also confirms a significant point repeatedly emphasized in recent decisions of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Indeed, in its most recent Akın Öztürk decision (§ 87), the Working Group once again highlighted the remarkable increase in cases of arbitrary detention in Turkey over the past seven years and warned that widespread or systematic imprisonment in violation of international law may constitute crimes against humanity. The Working Group made the same assessment in the cases of Cihangir Çenteli (§ 63), Levent Kart (§ 67), Ahmet Dinçer Sakaoğlu (§ 96), Osman Karaca (§ 76), and Muhammet Şentürk (§ 76). This assessment is based on the 24 decisions on unlawful detention that the Working Group has issued to date. In contrast, the ECtHR has so far found, in 68 consolidated cases, that a total of 3,310 individuals (including 1,225 former judges and prosecutors) were arbitrarily detained. Demirhan, however, makes this picture even more striking and provides a much stronger indication that judicial practices in Türkiye may amount to “crimes against humanity.” This is because the judgment concerns not only unlawful detention, but directly addresses the merits, namely, convictions.
According to the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code No. 5271, while “strong suspicion” (Art. 100/1) is considered sufficient for detention, a conviction requires that the defendant’s commission of the offense be proven “beyond reasonable doubt with concrete and convincing evidence” (Art. 223/2-e).
Therefore, it can be said that the ECtHR’s findings of violations of Articles 6 and 7 in respect of 239 applicants in Demirhan respond to the Working Group’s warning regarding crimes against humanity in its 24 cases of unlawful detention in a much more forceful manner. The ECtHR’s findings clearly demonstrate that judicial misconduct, particularly targeting members of the Gülen movement, has reached alarming proportions and has led to serious human rights violations.
Despite the Grand Chamber’s guidance in the Yalçınkaya case, as evidenced by the Demirhan violations, Türkiye’s repeated convictions related to ByLock not only reveal ongoing judicial flaws but also challenge the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. The Court’s reluctance to award compensation or costs, combined with the Committee of Ministers’ cautious enforcement, allows Türkiye to evade accountability. Despite calls to address detentions and executive interference, progress is limited. Thus, the ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers must adopt a resolute stance, including diplomatic pressure or sanctions like suspending Türkiye’s Council of Europe voting rights, to compel compliance.
The ECtHR’s findings highlight systemic judicial deficiencies: automatic case processing, inadequate reasoning, and restricted defence rights. Comprehensive reforms—merit-based judicial appointments, impartial oversight, transparent proceedings—are needed to insulate judges from political pressure. Strengthening judicial independence is critical to rebuild trust and ensure Convention compliance. These reforms are crucial to restoring democratic governance and preventing the systematic targeting of groups like the Gülen movement.
The Demirhan and Others v. Türkiye judgment, alongside Yüksel Yalçınkaya, exposes the systemic misuse of judicial processes to criminalize the Gülen movement, constituting a grave assault on human rights and the rule of law. By identifying 239 violations of Articles 7 and 6§1 in a single case—an unprecedented feat in the ECtHR’s 64-year history—the Court underscores the severity of Türkiye’s judicial abuses, which bear hallmarks of crimes against humanity under Article 77/1(c) of the Turkish Criminal Code due to systematic and arbitrary motivated deprivation of liberty. However, the ECtHR’s refusal to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage or costs and expenses undermines effective redress, particularly given the applicants’ profound suffering and the case’s scale. This, coupled with the Court’s and Council of Europe’s timid enforcement—evidenced by the Committee of Ministers’ cautious approach—fails to compel Türkiye’s compliance, allowing systemic violations to persist, as seen in thousands of pending ByLock-related applications. Türkiye’s non-compliance with ECtHR guidance highlights the urgent need for judicial within the Turkish judiciary to restore the rule of law and ensure alignment with ECHR standards. The ECtHR and the Council of Europe must take bolder measures, including sanctions, to address this systemic problem. Demirhan makes a critical call for meaningful reforms in Türkiye to ensure a fair solution, rebuild trust in the judiciary, and prevent democratic backsliding.
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2 Comments
Emeklerinize sağlık,tesekkürler
Bu kadar aşikar ve uluslararası mercilerce de teyit edilen “insanlığa karşı işlenenen suçlar” varken Lahey UCM Savcığının harekete geçmemesi inanılır gibi değil. Yeryüzünde 10 yılı aşkındır 70.000 kitlesel operasyona maruz kalan herhangi bir grup var mıdır?