May 29, 2026
By Felix Demeester
In Manjani v. Albania, the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘Court’) applied Article 8 ECHR in the context of access to public functions, specifically within the judiciary. The Court examines the requirement of an individualised and detailed assessment of integrity criteria for admission to the School of Magistrates, as well as the impact of a juvenile conviction on that assessment. This blog post first outlines the facts of the case, before analysing the Court’s reasoning.
The case concerns the refusal of an application for admission to a training program for magistrates at the School of Magistrates. The applicant, Mr Manjani, applied for a training program at the School of Magistrates in February 2020. In his application, Mr Manjani stated that he had been convicted of theft in 2006, at the age of 15, and that he had been rehabilitated. Mr Manjani was convicted in 2006 by the Bulqizë District Court for stealing money from a car. The Bulqizë District court noted that Mr Manjani had admitted his guilt, posed a low degree of social danger, and that the consequences were minimal as he had returned the money to the owner. As of December 2014, Mr Manjani had been rehabilitated.
When assessing his application for the training program for magistrates, the High Prosecutional Council decided that Mr Manjani did not meet the admission criterion under section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors due to this prior conviction. Section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors provides that a candidate for the School of Magistrates is excluded from admission if they are convicted by a final criminal judgment. Mr Manjani appealed the decision of the High Prosecutional Council on the grounds that, under Article 69(b) of the Criminal Code, he was considered to have no convictions because he had been rehabilitated. The Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, stating that section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors did not refer to a legal presumption of criminal records but to the fact of the conviction, regardless of rehabilitation.
The applicant subsequently appealed this before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and further clarified that the ban in section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors was aimed at guaranteeing the integrity required for a magistrate. Theft is a serious criminal offence which discredited the image of a public official for whom integrity is a necessity to ensure public trust in the justice system. Section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors looks at the nature of the offence committed, rather than at the circumstances. The fact that Mr Manjani had committed the offence as a minor could not be considered a mitigating factor, the Supreme Court decided. Furthermore, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint, stating that guaranteeing the integrity of public officials constituted a legitimate aim for protecting state independence, democratic order and national security.
Mr Manjani complained that the decision not to admit him to the School of Magistrates for training as a prosecutor on the basis of a juvenile conviction had violated his rights under Article 8 ECHR.
First things first, the Court analyses the admissibility of the complaint and the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. The Court reiterates that Article 8 does not exclude professional activities, as the majority of people develop relationships with the outside world through their working lives (Denisov v. Ukraine, para 100). The professional life of a person is often linked to their private life (Piskin v. Turkey, paras 172-178). Different aspects of private life may be affected by the non-admission to a profession: (i) the applicant’s inner circle; (ii) the applicant’s opportunity to develop relationships with others; and (iii) social and professional reputation.
The Court generally employs two approaches to establish whether professional disputes create private-life issues. The reason-based approach, which evaluates the underlying reasons for the impugned measure, and the consequence-based approach, which evaluates the consequences of the impugned measure on the private life of the applicant. The Court considers that both approaches are relevant in this case (para 31). The reason for the impugned measure is the applicant’s conviction 14 years prior to the refusal of his admission. The Court has previously held that, when a conviction recedes in the past, it becomes a part of the person’s private life that must be respected (M. M. v. The United Kingdom, para 188).
The consequence of the impugned measure also holds relevance to the applicant’s private life. The refusal of admission permanently denied the applicant from pursuing a career as a prosecutor. The Court previously held that a restriction on access to positions of public interest may affect the rights established in Article 8 ECHR, insofar as it prevents the individual from pursuing a career that corresponds to their professional qualifications (Naidin v. Romania, para 32). In the present case, the applicant’s refusal was entirely attributable to his prior conviction for an offence he committed as a minor. The absolute and permanent ban on admission to the School of Magistrates has a clear and serious impact on his personal choice on how he wants to pursue his professional and personal life (para 37). Therefore, Article 8 ECHR is applicable.
To evaluate whether the refusal of admission to the School of Magistrates based on a juvenile conviction constitutes an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, the Court must seek to ascertain whether the requirements of Article 8 § 2 ECHR are fulfilled. The Court has to evaluate whether the interference was ‘in accordance with the law’, pursuing a legitimate aim under that provision, and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (Piskin v. Turkey, para 203).
The Court accepts that the interference held a legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the Court accepts the aim put forward by the government of restoring public trust in the justice system, as pursuing the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and the rights and freedoms of others of Article 8 § 2 (para 47).
In order to determine whether the intervention was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the Court considers whether the reasons to justify the interferences were relevant and sufficient, and whether it was proportionate in relation to the pursued legitimate aims (Piskin v. Turkey, para 212). The Court has already established that national authorities may legitimately take measures to prevent certain individuals from exercising sensitive professions. However, this is subject to compliance with some requirements (Advisory opinion as to whether an individual may be denied authorisation to work as a security guard or officer on account of being close to or belonging to a religious movement [GC], request no. P16-2023-001, the Conseil d’État of Belgium, paras 84-85 and 92). The Court held that the risk analysis must take into account the nature of the specific role (ibid, para 93) and the personal situation of the individual concerned (ibid, para 100). In Manjani v. Albania, the Court notes that a general rule may restrict the access to prosecutors on grounds of integrity (para 51). However, this does not exclude the need for an individual assessment, especially with relevance to juvenile offences (para 51). The domestic courts limited their reasoning to the question of whether section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors would disqualify candidates who had been rehabilitated after a criminal conviction. The domestic authorities held that the fact that the applicant was a juvenile at the time could not override the serious nature of the offence (para 52). By limiting their assessment, the domestic courts did not undertake an individual analysis of the circumstances (para 53). Secondly, the domestic courts did not take into account the applicant’s age at the time of the offence. This stands in tension with the Court’s case-law. The Court has previously given special attention to age in cases involving interference with private life. The Court previously held that when assessing the nature and seriousness of offences, national authorities must take into account whether the individual committed the crime as a juvenile or an adult (Maslov v. Austria, para 72). By disregarding the applicant’s age at the time of the offences, the national authorities failed to properly take into account these considerations (para 58).
Furthermore, the national authorities failed to take into account a number of relevant circumstances, such as the non-violent character of the offence (para 58). Having considered the above, the Court finds the interference to be disproportionate. The Court therefore unanimously states a violation of Article 8 ECHR (para 60).
In this judgment, the Court applied the individual and detailed assessment criteria previously articulated in the Advisory opinion as to whether an individual may be denied authorisation to work as a security guard or officer on account of being close to or belonging to a religious movement [GC], request no. P16-2023-001, the Conseil d’État of Belgium. This opinion regarded the question of whether the affiliation to a religious group, which was considered a threat to the country, could constitute an unfavourable measure against an individual in the light of Article 9 § 2 ECHR. The unfavourable measure in casu was the ban on employment as a security guard. The Court decided, in the advisory opinion, that ‘national authorities may legitimately defend the values of a democratic society in the face of any threat to those values, by having recourse to preventive measures which may potentially restrict rights’ (para 85). However, the Court also laid down several requirements to establish how such a risk must be assessed.
In the Manjani v. Albania judgment, the Court applies these requirements. Most importantly, the Court developed the requirement for the national authorities to carry out an individual and detailed assessment in light of the personal situation of the individual concerned. This signifies that the legitimate pursuit of judicial integrity does not justify automatic disqualifications for judges and prosecutors. This judgment is of particular jurisprudential value because the Court demonstrates that the review of a restriction is not confined to the abstract legitimacy of its aim but extends to its concrete application to the individual candidate.
In its individual and detailed assessment, the Court has given significant importance to the juvenile character of the applicant at the time of the criminal offence. The Court refers to the Maslov principles. The Maslov case law was developed in a very different context, Maslov v. Austria concerned the expulsion of a foreign national. The Court held that when assessing the nature and the seriousness of offences committed by an applicant, it had to be taken into account whether they committed them as a juvenile or an adult (Maslov v. Austria, para 72). By referring to this case law, the Court extrapolates the Maslov principles to the sphere of professional exclusion.
A question that the Court failed to answer concerns the quality of law requirement of Article 8 § 2. The applicant alleged that the domestic law did not meet the quality of law requirement. The rejection of the applicant’s admission was based on section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors Act. The version of this section that was in force at the time of the ban against the applicant’s admission did not specify the role of rehabilitation towards its application. In 2021, whilst the applicant’s case was pending before the Supreme Court, the section was amended. The new version clarified the importance of rehabilitation for Section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors Act. This new version granted limited significance to rehabilitation and prioritised the nature of the offence and its impact on the public image of magistrates. The Court notes that the national courts appeared to have followed the logic of the new version of Section 28(d) of the Status of Judges and Prosecutors Act in the case of Mr Manjani. In light of this, the Court raises concerns about the foreseeability of the law to the applicant, as this new version was not yet established at the time of the refusal of Mr Manjani’s application (§ 46). The Court does not go further into this issue. The Court argues that it was not necessary to evaluate whether the interference was ‘in accordance with the law’ as the interference ‘was not necessary in a democratic society’.
The judgment in Manjani v. Albania confirms that Article 8 ECHR plays a significant role in regulating access to public functions. While national authorities remain entitled to impose integrity requirements, the Court makes clear that such criteria cannot be applied in an automatic and abstract manner. Instead, authorities are required to carry out a concrete and individualised assessment of each candidate. In this respect, the Court emphasises that authorities must give special consideration to the juvenile status of candidates when assessing their criminal offences for the purposes of integrity requirements.
Strasbourg Observers is an academic blog that discusses recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. The editorial team of Strasbourg Observers is based at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University and the Centre for Government and Law of Hasselt University.
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