A worrisome reasoning by the Strasbourg Court in a domestic violence case: Kurt v. Austria

By Zane Ratniece

On 4 July 2019, a Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘Court’) delivered a judgment in Kurt v. Austria. The case concerned a disturbing situation of domestic violence, which escalated over time and ended with the killing of the applicant’s son by her violent husband. (para. 3) The Chamber found that the Austrian authorities had not breached their obligation under Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention’) to protect the boy’s life from the criminal acts of his father. (para. 80)

This contribution opines that the reasoning by which the Chamber arrived at those conclusions is worrisome for its silence on the particular context of domestic violence and the vulnerability of the victims. Such approach does not sit well with more recent Court’s case-law which expressly acknowledges the particular context of domestic violence. Hence, Kurt risks questioning the progress made in the Court’s case-law and creating uncertainty as regards the standards to be followed in dealing with the widespread and complex phenomenon of domestic violence, requiring active State involvement. Continue reading

Volodina, Article 3, and Russia’s systemic problem regarding domestic violence

By Corina Heri, postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam

‘When he kills you, come and see us’, police reportedly told the applicant in Volodina v. Russia before proceeding to ignore her allegations of domestic violence. On 9 July, the Third Section found that the respondent State had violated its positive obligations under Article 3 and, applying a gender-based approach, held that Russia has a large-scale structural problem when it comes to domestic violence. This post discusses the Chamber’s findings under Articles 3 and 14 ECHR, the question of whether this treatment constituted torture, and how to test compliance with the obligation to prevent ill-treatment. Continue reading

ECtHR or CEDAW: Spoilt for Choice in Moldova?

By Irina Crivet (PhD Candidate, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey)

The proliferation of international and regional human rights bodies has given the victims of human rights violations the chance to pick and choose where they can send their complaints. Whilst these choices are limited by geographical locations of individuals and the states’ acceptance of right to individual petition before multiple bodies, today some individuals and their lawyers have more than one choice. Moldova is one such country. Individuals can submit applications either before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – or before  quasi-judicial human rights bodies of the United Nations, the UN Treaty Bodies (UNTBs).

This blog post examines the effects of this proliferation for Moldovan victims of domestic violence who can take cases both before the ECtHR and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW or the Committee). In doing so, I first examine the ECtHR case law regarding domestic violence in Moldova and the status of views adopted by UNTBs against Moldova. Continue reading

Talpis v. Italy: Elements to Show An Article 14 Violation in Domestic Violence Cases

What are the elements necessary to support a finding of discrimination in domestic violence cases? In the recent case of Talpis v. Italy, two judges voted against an Article 14 violation. The dissenting opinions offer an opportunity to reflect on this and other broader questions that may be relevant for future cases. The questions flow from disagreement in the judgment over: whether the domestic authorities involved in the individual case were discriminatory towards the applicant as a woman and whether there were sufficient indications of failures to protect women in the Italian system.

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Back on track! Court acknowledges gendered nature of domestic violence in M.G. v. Turkey

This guest post was written by Fleur van Leeuwen (*)

Around a month ago, the Court ruled in Civek v. Turkey that it was not necessary to examine the applicant’s complaint of discrimination in a domestic violence case that ended in death. This was disheartening, especially because in recent domestic violence judgments the Court has always addressed alleged violations of article 14. What was perhaps even more disturbing about the Civek judgement was that the Court – without any apparent reason – observed that men can also be victims of domestic violence, thereby implying that domestic violence is a gender neutral phenomenon. In doing so, it seconded the worrisome wording of the Istanbul Convention,[1] which – by denoting that men may also be victims of domestic violence and by referring to violence against women and domestic violence – explicitly positions the latter as a gender neutral form of violence.

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