Reproductive health

Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy: Lost in Recognition. Filiation of an Adopted Embryo born by Surrogate Woman in a Foreign Country

Guest Blogger Reproductive health, Right to Private Life, Right to Respect for Family Life

By Elena Ignovska, Assistant professor, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Law, Skopje, Macedonia.

Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) undoubtedly triggered an earthquake in the concept of parenthood, resulting in a fragmentation of the possible parents: genetic/biological, gestational, factual and legal. Their initial objective was to enable infertile couples to parent genetically related progeny. Yet, they have recently been used in ways that are detached from that initial purpose, which may be problematic from the viewpoint of national family law. A typical example of that is the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy which demonstrated the opposite intention: using foreign assistance in reproduction for purposes of parenting a non-gestational and genetically unrelated child. The issue before the Court concerned a removal of the child from his intended parents as a result of a (non)recognition of a foreign birth certificate. Continue reading →

Dubská and Krejzová v. Czech Republic: a ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ right to give birth at home?

Laurens Lavrysen Reproductive health, Right to Private Life

By Laurens Lavrysen

In the case of Dubská and Krejzová v. Czech Republic, the Strasbourg Court had to pronounce itself on the regulation of home birth under Czech law. While on the one hand Czech law allowed for home births, on the other hand it prohibited midwives from assisting them. In its judgment of 11 December, the Court found no violation of the right to respect for private life (Article 8), mainly based on the increased risks to the lives and health of newborn and mother vis-à-vis a hospital birth in case of complications. The Court thereby endorsed the paradoxical Czech legal framework under which relatively safe home births with the assistance of a midwife are prohibited on health grounds, whereas unsafe home births without such assistance are allowed. It is argued that by constructing the case as one involving a narrow conception of ‘interference’, the Court failed to look at the broader picture of what it means to effectively secure a human right. Such a more holistic understanding requires an appreciation of both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ aspects of Article 8 at stake in the present case.

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P and S v. Poland: adolescence, vulnerability, and reproductive autonomy

Guest Blogger P and S v. Poland, Prohibition of Inhuman Treatment, Reproductive health, Right to Private Life, Women's Rights

The Strasbourg Observers are delighted to publish this guest post by Johanna Westeson, Regional Director for Europe, Center for Reproductive Rights. The Center for Reproductive Rights represented the applicants in P and S v. Poland before the ECtHR; see the Center’s press release here.

This week, the European Court of Human Rights issued its decision in P and S v. Poland, a case of a Polish teenager who became pregnant as a result of rape and was humiliated, harassed, and manipulated in her quest for a legal abortion. Building on the landmark cases against Poland’s restrictive abortion practice, Tysiąc v. Poland (2007) and R.R. v. Poland (2011) (see blog posts here and here), this judgment further clarifies the Court’s stance that reproductive health services that are legal must also be accessible. It also develops important reasoning on the vulnerability of young rape victims as well as their right to personal autonomy in matters of reproductive choice. The Court establishes that P and S had been subjected to several violations of their rights under Article 8, Article 5, and Article 3. This is a groundbreaking case, particularly in regard to the sexual and reproductive rights of adolescents. It opens the door to legal challenges to regimes that restrict young people’s reproductive self-determination, such as parental consent laws and strict procedural requirements to prove rape as a requirement for access to legal abortion. Continue reading →