Guest post by Natasa Mavronicola, Lecturer in Law at Queen’s University Belfast.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a juvenile and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police. The background and finding of substantive violation are outlined in Stijn Smet’s blog post here.
In this post, I want to concentrate briefly on the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – in its finding of a substantive breach of Article 3, and distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.