This guest post was written by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Professor of Law and Anthropology at Brighton Business School, University of Brighton. (*)
It does not seem an exaggeration to say that the recent judgment in Ramadan v. Malta suggests that citizenship revocation is not generally problematic under the European Convention on Human Rights. How else might one understand the statement according to which ‘an arbitrary revocation of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of its impact on the private life of the individual’ (para 85)? Strictly speaking, the quoted words appear to indicate that a revocation of citizenship, even when arbitrary, could fail to violate the Convention. How is this possible? One should not have to argue that arbitrary revocations of citizenship are unfathomable in a human rights perspective. The phrasing adopted by the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights is unfortunate, to say the least. So are its reasoning and verdict of non-violation. A change of perspective is needed. Nationality matters enormously – it matters so much that it has to be a core human rights issue, and it is high time the European Court of Human Rights should recognise this.