By Lize R. Glas, Assistant Professor of European Law, Radboud University, the Netherlands
In a previous blog, I recalled how the Russian delegation managed to return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Assembly) without sanctions in June 2019. The return of these members meant the end of their refusal to submit their credentials in the years 2016-2019. That refusal, in turn, had been a reaction to the Assembly’s April 2014 decision to suspend the Russian members’ voting (and some other) rights because of, inter alia, Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
When ratifying the credentials of the Russian delegation in June 2019, the Assembly called on Russia to do a number of things, including fulfilling previous Assembly resolutions, returning 24 illegally captured sailors to Ukraine, paying all fees due to the Council of Europe, protecting LGBTQI+ people, and cooperating in the investigation of the downing of the MH17 flight and the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov. The delegation was requested to cooperate with the Assembly’s committees and engage in a meaningful dialogue. The Assembly expected that this dialogue would lead to concrete results, and invited its Monitoring Committee to report on the honouring of obligations by Russia no later than April 2020.
During the 2021 winter plenary session of the Assembly, which took place from 25 to 28 January, the credentials of the Russian delegation were challenged (again). In this blog, I will explain how the relation between the Assembly and Russia has developed since June 2019, discuss the 2021 winter plenary session, and comment on what these events tell us about the Assembly’s approach towards Russia and the steps that its representatives are prepared to take against that state and its delegation.Continue reading