February 27, 2026
Dear readers,
As we enter 2026, we at Strasbourg Observers want to take the opportunity to reflect upon last year. When it comes to the state of human rights across the globe, 2025 has proved to be yet another challenging year. The Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to cause bloodshed and suffering. In the Middle East, at least 70.000 Palestinians have lost their lives, with the suffering continuing even after the ceasefire. Additionally, democratic foundations have come under increasing pressure, both within Council of Europe territory and beyond. Amidst rising populism, political polarisation and support for far-right parties, international law and human rights seem to be increasingly coming under siege. The US has withdrawn from over 65 international organisations and UN Agencies, several states have left the ICC and others have refused, or indicated they would refuse, to enforce its arrest order against Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Meanwhile, through alliances between centre-right and far-right forces in the European Parliament, the EU is adopting increasingly restrictive migration policies and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) finds itself facing unprecedented – and frankly unacceptable – political pressure to narrow the scope of protection available to migrants under both the right to private and family life and the prohibition of torture.
Against the backdrop of these difficult circumstances and with the prospect of a political declaration on issues related to migration under the ECHR looming on the horizon, the ECtHR has continued its mission to strengthen the protection of human rights in its Member States. Indeed, 2025 marked the 75th anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights, and hence a year of celebration as well as of challenge. According to its own statistical data of 2025, the Court decided on more than 38,500 cases and noted an 11% decrease in cases pending before the Court compared to 2024. Of these pending applications, Türkiye continues to take up the largest share, followed by Russia and Ukraine. Although the Court may not always go quite as far as we would like it to, it continues to play an important role in the European human rights architecture, bolstering the protections available to all those within its jurisdiction and providing a final recourse for those who have suffered at the hands of Contracting States. For this, we applaud it.
Much like the Court, our team at Strasbourg Observers has continued to work hard this year to provide our readers with interesting and thought-provoking blog posts on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 2025 marked the 15th anniversary of the blog, which we celebrated by hosting a two-day symposium in May. Additionally, we hosted two blog symposia: on the Grand Chamber judgment in Semenya v. Switzerland in September, and on the role of the Court and its stance vis-à-vis conservatism or progressivism in December. We are, as ever, grateful to all authors who wrote a contribution to our blog over the course of last year, and to our readers, the Court and the academic community in general for making it possible to continue our discussions on the Court’s case law.
Our blog posts have sought to both praise and critique the Court, and now we are giving our readers the chance to do the same. As the tradition at Strasbourg Observers goes, the time has come to launch our annual ‘Best and Worst’ voting poll, in which we ask you to vote for your picks in the categories ‘Best judgment’, ‘Worst judgment’ and ‘Best separate opinion’. Our teams have assembled a shortlist of five nominees per category after an internal selection and voting round. From these five candidates, we invite you to vote for your top pick per category. Additionally, if you think another case or opinion that was not shortlisted is more deserving of receiving our ‘award’ instead, you may fill in the field ‘Other’. We welcome all of you to share the reasons for your votes in the comments section below!
As usual, we have provided an overview of the key aspects of the nominated cases below, along with links to the relevant blog posts and judgments. In which case did the Court have a particularly important impact on human rights and did it employ particularly clear and accurate legal reasoning? In which case, conversely, do you reckon the Court’s reasoning left something to be desired or could more far-reaching human rights protection have been appropriate? Lastly, which judges demonstrated compelling legal reasoning, detailed knowledge of the context of a case, or particular dedication to the cause of human rights? We look forward to learning about your views on these questions!
The polls are open until 20 March 2026. The results of the voting will be announced at the end of March.
See our blog post here.
Google LLC and others v. Russia concerned the imposition of disproportionately high fines on Google LLC for refusing to remove political content from Youtube and failing to restore a Russian television outlet’s Youtube account. The television outlet was owned by a Russian oligarch who had been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for his support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 in connection with both the administrative proceedings concerning the content removal requests and the requirement to provide services to the TV channel. It also found a violation of Article 6.1 as the domestic courts had not provided adequate justification for their decisions.
As highlighted by Babette de Naeyer on our blog, Google LLC was the first time that the ECtHR explicitly addressed the rights and responsibilities of a major content sharing platform like Facebook, Instagram or Twitter under Article 10. The ruling comes at a timely moment, following the entry into force of the EU’s Digital Services Act in February 2024 and with the new EU Digital Fairness Act expected to be adopted in 2026. Although the Court failed to clarify users’ procedural rights against platforms, the ruling is significant not only because it represents a first step in clarifying the rights and duties of online platforms but because it directly challenges practices of indirect government censorship by coercing private entities through financial penalties and affirms the need for robust safeguards surrounding take-down orders to prevent governments from targeting legitimate dissent.
See our blog post here.
I.C. v Moldova concerned a woman with an intellectual disability who was abandoned at birth and who spent her whole life in institutional care. In 2013, she was placed in the care of a family living on a remote farm. Although presented as part of Moldova’s deinstitutionalisation efforts, it was arranged with the specific intention that she would become the “wife” of one of the farm’s workers, who had wanted a family. During the five years she spent at the farm she was forced to perform unpaid labour and sexually abused. In its ruling, the ECtHR held that Moldova violated Articles 4, 3, 8, and 14 of the Convention. It recognised that her lifelong institutionalisation, disability, and gender made her especially vulnerable, and that the authorities had ignored warning signs, relied on biased assessments, and did not properly investigate her complaints.
From Lorena Sosa’s post on our blog: ‘The case of I.C. v. The Republic of Moldova intersects with two strands of ECtHR jurisprudence: (1) the Court’s developing understanding of sexual violence, rape and sexual exploitation, and (2) its evolving anti-stereotyping framework, particularly regarding persons with disabilities. Against the backdrop of landmark rulings, this judgment further enriches the Court’s often conflicting jurisprudence by explicitly engaging with intersectional discrimination, structural inequalities, and the harms of stereotyping.’
See our blog post here.
M.P. and others v. Greece concerned a mother and her two children, who complained about the return of the children to their parents in the US by order of the Greek courts in international child abduction proceedings. In its ruling, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 as the Greek courts had assessed the situation without considering whether it would be appropriate to hear the children’s views. As the domestic courts had not done so, they could not make an informed assessment of whether there was a ‘grave risk’ to the children within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the decision-making process did not meet the requirements of Article 8. With its ruling in this case, the ECtHR established that domestic courts have a duty to examine, proprio motu, whether it would be appropriate to hear the views of the children affected before ruling on their return to a parent in child abduction cases. In doing so, it strengthened the rights of children in child abduction proceedings.
As explained by Elena Patrizi in her post on our blog: ‘M.P. and Others v. Greece […] addresses the question of hearing children in international abduction proceedings, making a significant contribution to the evolution of the case law of the [ECtHR] on this matter. For the first time, the Court clearly affirms the obligation of domestic courts to assess whether it is appropriate to hear the child before deciding whether to return him or her to a parent in cases of child abduction.’
See our blog post here.
In N.D. v. Switzerland, the ECtHR built on its well-established line of domestic violence jurisprudence to recognise the issue of femicide in its caselaw. The case concerned a woman who was kidnapped from her home after informing her partner, X, that she was ending their relationship. He falsely imprisoned her for over 11 hours, during which time he raped and attempted to murder her. In its ruling, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 2 as the national authorities involved in the case had not done all that they could reasonably be expected to do to avert the real and immediate risk to the applicant’s life, of which they had or ought to have been aware.
As explained by Angela Hefti on our blog: ‘The [ECtHR’s] recognition of a case of violence against women as femicide is significant. N.D. v. Switzerland suggests that the kinds of risks women face are gender-specific and require a distinct legal response. Although the judgment is brief, it affirms the central role the right to life plays in femicide and sets a positive direction for future femicide judgments that build on the Court’s domestic violence case law. The Court also reiterated that acts of gender-based violence should not be viewed in isolation but are embedded in the broader dynamics of this type of harm. The case provides a foundation for lawyers to advance arguments on the prohibition of ill-treatment and torture, and to situate this harm within the broader systemic context in which it occurs.’
See the posts on our blog here and here.
The Grand Chamber ruling in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia addressed Russia’s responsibility for human rights violations arising from the conflict that began in eastern Ukraine in 2014 following the arrival in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of pro-Russian armed groups, and escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning on 24 February 2022. It also concerned the shooting down of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, killing all those on board, many of whom were Dutch nationals. In respect of the conflict in Ukraine between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022 (when Russia ceased to be a party to the ECHR) there had been patterns of violations of Articles 2, 4, 5, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1. It also found that there had been violations of Article 2, 3 and 13 in relation to the downing of flight MH17 and that Russia had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 38 (obligation to furnish necessary facilities for the examination of the case).
The Court’s ruling in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia clarified the relationship between the ECHR and international humanitarian law (IHL). As noted by Giorgi Nakashidze in his post on our blog, the ruling shows that the Court has ‘moved away from its traditionally cautious and reluctant approach to IHL and redefined itself as a monitoring mechanism for IHL’, at least, in cases involving international armed conflict between parties to the ECHR. Indeed, as David Khachatryan argues in his post on our blog, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, may well become ‘the ECtHR’s own “Nicaragua moment,” a turning point where the Court shows it is ready to grapple with patterns of violence and proxy warfare at Europe’s doorstep, and to shape the law for years to come. Much like the ICJ’s Nicaragua decision left a deep and lasting mark on international law by engaging with the realities of contemporary conflict, the Grand Chamber’s ruling has the potential to redefine how European human rights law responds to the shifting landscape of armed conflict, occupation, and state responsibility.’
See our blog post here.
In A.R.E. v. Greece and G.R.J. v. Greece, the Court was for the first time confronted with migrant-pushback allegations in which the respondent Government denied not only parts of the factual account but any involvement whatsoever, including the applicants’ presence on its territory and any systematic practice of pushbacks. Referring to reports by domestic and international human rights bodies, the Court recognised that a systematic practice of pushbacks existed in Greece at the relevant time. In such circumstances, it held that applicants may shift the burden of proof onto the Government if they provide ‘comprehensive and concordant’ evidence linking their alleged pushback to that practice. The cases illustrate how difficult this evidentiary threshold is to meet. In A.R.E., it took an overwhelming amount of evidence for the Court to find Convention violations; in G.R.J., the burden was not met and the application was declared inadmissible ratione personae. The Court clarified that even amidst a systemic pushback practice, it is insufficient for an account to largely correspond to the modus operandi emerging from human rights reports or to merely show entry into the respondent state followed by presence in the receiving state on the dates alleged.
From our blog post by Stephanie Motz and Annina Mullis: ‘The shift of the burden of proof onto the Greek government – once a systematic pushback practice and a systematic failure to conduct criminal investigations had been found – would have been an effective procedural tool in the Court’s repertoire to counter [a] systematic refusal to investigate pushback incidents. Instead, the government’s tactics of denial and deflection have, to an extent, been rewarded by the inadmissibility decision in the case of G.R.J., thereby undermining protection standards for refugees in Europe. (… citing Katsoni): ‘The more inadequate and ineffective domestic investigations – and, one might add, the more absolute the denial of any border violence practice – the lesser the chances of an acknowledgment of the State’s responsibility for refoulement.’
See our blog post here.
Bodson and Others v. Belgium concerned the criminal conviction to suspended prison sentences of 17 participants to a general strike organised by the General Federation of Belgian Trade Unions. The applicants were convicted in particular of the offence of ‘maliciously obstructing road traffic’, following their presence at an unauthorised road blockade of a major motorway. The Court did not find these convictions to amount to disproportionate infringements of the freedom of assembly and association protected by art. 11 ECHR.
In a post for our blog, Alice Dejean de la Bâtie criticised the Court’s proportionality assessment on a number of counts. She particularly points out that: ‘one of the most problematic aspects of the Bodson judgment concerns the consideration of the applicants’ role as trade unionists. Although their conviction was not explicitly based on their status, the Belgian judges held their position as union leaders or members against them, arguing that their influence over the group facilitated the obstruction. This reasoning raises concerns under Article 14 of the European Convention (…) The imposition of increased liability on the basis of their trade union involvement could be interpreted as indirect discrimination, as the severity of the sanctions appears to be linked to their membership of an organisation defending workers’ rights. The approach taken by the Belgian courts, and upheld by the ECtHR, is based on the idea that even informal leadership increases the responsibility of the organisers and thus justifies harsher repression. This logic poses a significant risk to collective mobilisation. It implies that the more structured and organised a movement is, the harsher the punishment of its active members. Yet, structure is a fundamental characteristic of many social, trade union and political movements.’
See our blog post here.
In Mansouri v. Italy (Grand Chamber), the Court consolidated an emerging trend in its case law of giving stronger effect to the non-exhaustion rule in light of the principle of subsidiarity. Whereas the Court previously held that longstanding general remedies which have never been successfully used for a given situation are ‘theoretical and abstract’ and do not have to be exhausted – it now does require this as it ‘create[s] an opportunity for the development of domestic case-law on this subject’. In Mansouri, the applicant, a Tunisian national, was refused entry to Italy on a cruise ship arriving from Tunis and confined in a locked cabin for seven days to facilitate his return. Applying its new approach, the Court declared his complaint of unlawful deprivation of liberty inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, even though at the time the (compensatory and injunction) remedies in question had never been successfully used in a situation such as the applicant’s.
In a blog post, Lorenzo Acconciamessa points out that even though the Court’s new approach might be a desirable from a systemic point of view, ‘the applicant was actually diligent in not lodging [the proposed] action: otherwise, he would have run the risk of the Court finding that, since he had exhausted a remedy that the Court had declared non-effective, his application had been lodged too late (…). By contrast, the Grand Chamber required him to exhaust in 2016 a remedy that, according to the available case-law of the Court and in the absence of domestic case-law developments, was not effective. This can be hardly reconciled with the importance the Court attaches to the ‘stability and foreseeability of its case-law in terms of legal certainty’ (…). Obviously, the Court, especially the Grand Chamber, can overrule previous findings. However, the same Court has held under Article 6 that conditions of admissibility of judicial actions cannot be retrospectively applied (…), and found breaches of this provision where an action had been dismissed on the basis of the need (which was not foreseeable) to previously exhaust another remedy.’
See our blog symposium here.
In Semenya v. Switzerland, the Grand Chamber ruled on fair-trial, discrimination and private life complaints in the case of Caster Semenya, the multiple world and Olympic middle-distance running champion, who had challenged World Athletics’ rules requiring certain female athletes with differences of sex development (DSD) to lower their testosterone to compete. Semenya’s direct challenge to the DSD Regulations before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) – which exercises mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction within the World Athletics framework and has its seat in Lausanne – failed, as did annulment proceedings before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In its initial Chamber judgment, the ECtHR had found violations of the right to non-discrimination and to an effective remedy, pointing to the lack of resolution in the CAS-award of various serious questions regarding the validity of the DSD regulation (in light of e.g. the side effects of hormone treatment and lacking evidence on athletic advantage of DSD athletes) as well as to the very limited review of the Federal Supreme Court – being restricted to narrowly interpreted public policy considerations.
In the Grand Chamber judgment the Court departed from these findings by ruling that the article 8, 13 and 14 ECHR complaints were inadmissible ratione personae and loci for lack of sufficient jurisdictional link between the challenged DSD regulation (enacted by World Athletics, incorporated in Monaco) and Switzerland. It did find a violation of the right to a fair trial under art. 6 §1 of the Convention, finding that ‘the specific characteristics of the sports arbitration to which the applicant was subject, entailing the mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of the CAS, required an in-depth judicial review – commensurate with the seriousness of the personal rights at issue – by the [Federal Supreme Court]’ and that the Federal Supreme Court’s reasoning ‘did not satisfy [this] requirement of particular rigour’.
As highlighted in our blog-symposium on the Semenya judgment, it stands open to criticism for its findings regarding lack of jurisdiction for purposes of arts. 8, 13 and 14 ECHR (see Sarah Tin and Partly Dissenting Joint Opinion of Judges Bošnjak, Šimáčková and Derenčinović), its lack of engagement with questions around CAS’ status as an independent and impartial ‘tribunal established by law’ in the sense of art. 6 §1 ECHR ( see Faraz Shahlaei and Antoine Duval and Partly Concurring Opinion Judge Šimáčková) and for the legal uncertainty created by a lack of clarity in some aspects of its reasoning (see Emilie Weible, Claudio Cerqueira and Dr. Marjolaine Viret and Partly Dissenting Joint Opinion of Judges Eicke and Kucsko-Stadlmayer).
See our blog post here.
S.S. and Others v. Italy concerned complaints under Articles 2, 3 and 4 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 brought by 17 migrants following a chaotic rescue mission in the Mediterranean. The rubber dinghy on which the applicants had attempted to cross to Europe had begun to sink and had sent out a distress signal, which was picked up by the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). The MRCC requested all nearby vessels to provide assistance and transferred coordination of the mission to the Libyan authorities. This led to the simultaneous presence of an NGO (Sea-Watch) rescue boat, a Libyan rescue vessel, an Italian navy helicopter and a French military vessel. The Libyan boat carried out various dangerous manoeuvres, creating strong water movement that caused several people to fall overboard and drown. The Libyan crew did not provide life-jackets, struck people in the water with ropes, and bound and beat those it hoisted aboard. It also actively boycotted attempts by lifeboats sent out by Sea-Watch to provide assistance. The incident was filmed by Sea-Watch. The Court found that the events did not fall within Italian extraterritorial jurisdiction due to the lack of effective control over the area and the absence of state agent authority and control over the Libyan ship. The complaints were therefore inadmissible. Arguments seeking to establish a jurisdictional link by referring to the financial and technical support provided by Italy to the Libyan State under bilateral agreements, or to the MRCC’s initiating role in the rescue operation, were rejected. The Court did make some obiter dicta statements regarding States’ responsibilities to safeguard the rights of migrants and to avoid the creation of a legal vacuum.
In a blog post, Thomas Spijkerboer criticised this gap between the Court’s rhetoric and its actual decision: ‘The Court considers that the migration context and the maritime setting cannot justify practices that are incompatible with the Convention and cannot justify an area outside the law. But the Court has done just that by deciding that the deaths and inhuman treatment occurred outside the scope of European human rights law. It holds that Italy cannot be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its general policies, and it can also not be held responsible for the concrete application of these policies in this particular case. How can the Court expect the reader to take it seriously when it states that there is no legal vacuum? (…) Apparently, the Court expects us, the public, to believe that we take its claim that violations of the Convention are not to be accepted at face value. We are supposed not to notice that the Court has accepted precisely that by not pronouncing itself.’
See our blog post here.
Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece concerned the interception of a vessel carrying migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, where members of the Greek coast guard and the Frontex agency at one point opened fire, killing a child. In its judgment, the majority found violations of Article 2 under both the procedural and substantive limb, but did not find that the use of force, resulting in the child’s death, had been excessive. The majority had placed the burden of proof with the applicants to demonstrate that the use of force had not been absolutely necessary.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hüseynov disagreed with the majority’s reasoning on the burden of proof to demonstrate the necessity of using (lethal) force. He provided ample examples of previous case law in which the Court had reversed the burden of proof and instead demanded the respondent State to prove that the use of force had in fact been necessary. This opinion illustrated how this case deviated – seemingly inexplicably – from this previous approach, and emphasised how this may harm the protection of individuals’ right to life under Article 2.
See our blog post here.
In Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Grand Chamber overturned the previous Chamber decision and ruled that the case was inadmissible. In this case, the applicant argued that he had been discriminated against due to a constitutional rule in Bosnia, by virtue of which only Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs could stand as candidates for presidential elections or elections to the House of Peoples. While the Chamber found this rule to contravene the Convention, the majority of the Grand Chamber ruled the case inadmissible, finding that the applicant had abused his right of individual application and that he lacked victim status.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Vehabović disagreed with the majority’s approach, describing it instead as a ‘strategic retreat’, stating that the majority had effectively shut out Bosnian voters from challenging the frequently litigated constitutional rule of ‘constituent peoples’. Aside from pointing out several procedural flaws, Judge Vehabović criticised the majority’s interpretation of the victim status requirement, calling it inconsistent with the Court’s previous case law. He warns for a glaringly dangerous implication of this judgment: that ‘broad or systemic harm is somehow beyond the reach of an individual application’.
See our blog post here.
N.D. v. Switzerland concerned a case in which the State was found to have failed its positive obligation to protect the applicant from domestic violence, suffered at the hands of her former boyfriend who had a record of violent behaviour towards his partners. The majority, for the first time, explicitly engaged with the concept of femicide in its reasoning, and found that the State had not honored its positive obligation under Article 2 by failing to inform the applicant of the perpetrator’s violent past. However, several dissenting judges argued that this interpretation of Article 2 would impose an impossible burden on police forces and authorities.
In her concurring opinion, Judge Elósegui diligently engages with this concern, highlighting the dangers of gender-based violence. Drawing from already existing frameworks in the United Kingdom and Spain, she illustrates how the positive obligation of authorities to coordinate their knowledge-sharing and actions is not only far from an excessive burden – it is a practice that has already generated promising results in other Council of Europe Member States.
See our blog post here.
This case concerned various sanctions imposed on individuals and media outlets over their criticising of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which were deemed attempts to discredit the military and instances of ‘disseminating knowingly false information’. The applicants were subsequently labelled ‘extremists’ and ‘foreign agents’. The Court found violations of multiple provisions, including Articles 3, 8 and 10.
In a widely cited separate opinion, Judge Pavli analysed the Court’s role in protecting the principles of democracy and the rule of law in ‘democratically challenged systems’. Noting the path that Russia had gone down, he wonders whether the Court could have done more in protecting democracy, takes stock of the shortcomings of the Court’s current toolbox of democracy protection measures and calls for the development of new tools, so that the Court could fulfill its role of protecting democracies in its Member States as its founders had intended it to do.
See our blog post here.
In this Grand Chamber judgment, the applicant companies alleged that the interception of data in the context of criminal proceedings and the transmitting of said data had violated their right to respect for private life under Article 8. The majority did not agree, finding no violation on account of the fact that ex post facto judicial review had addressed the applicants’ complaints. The majority scrutinised the domestic judges’ reasoning, but found that there was no reason to believe these proceedings had been unreasonable or ineffective.
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Arnardóttir, joined by Judges Serghides and Šimačková, disagreed with the majority and argued that Article 8 had indeed been violated. The judges argued that the majority’s reasoning lowers the level of data protection compared to the level provided by EU law by not diligently assessing the weight of the interests of the persons affected by the interception of data. Furthermore, Dutch law grants excessive discretion to prosecuting authorities, who are not obliged to motivate their interception decisions. The majority’s reasoning that this may be remedied by ex post facto judicial review contradicts the Court’s previous case law that contemporaneous motivation constitutes an important safeguard against abuse or arbitrariness. The dissenting judges lament the omission of such an important safeguard, illustrating the potentially adverse consequences for data protection.
Strasbourg Observers is an academic blog that discusses recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. The editorial team of Strasbourg Observers is based at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University and the Centre for Government and Law of Hasselt University.
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