August 11, 2026
By Igor Mirzakhanyan
Amid ongoing discussions about the potential withdrawal of interstate cases before the ECtHR (along with all other claims before international legal forums) pursuant to Article XV of the initialed agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Court has delivered a new judgment concerning the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict. On 18 June 2026, the Court handed down its judgment in V.T. and Others v. Azerbaijan, immediately giving rise to renewed debate. Although the case concerns alleged violations of Convention rights during the four-day war of April 2016 rather than the more recent hostilities of 2020-2023, its timing has made it particularly significant. Against the backdrop of discussions about withdrawal for the sake of the peace process, the judgment has inevitably become part of a broader conversation about accountability, justice, and the future of litigation arising from the conflict.
The case originates from the escalation of the Artsakh conflict in April 2016, which began on the night of 1-2 April and ended with the ceasefire of 5 April, commonly referred to as the ‘four-day war’. It is one of the applications grouped together with K.S. and N.A. v. Azerbaijan and 21 other cases, all concerning allegations of the mutilation of deceased servicemen and the resulting violations of Convention rights.
The Court communicated all 22 applications jointly and has already completed its deliberations in the group. Yet, in an interesting procedural development, it chose to deliver a judgment only in V.T. and Others, while the remaining 21 applications are still awaiting judgment. The reasons for this procedural choice remain unclear. V.T. and Others was neither the first application lodged nor does it appear, at least publicly, to possess any distinctive factual or legal feature that would obviously justify separating it from the rest of the group.
The application was brought by the parents and sister of H.T., an Armenian serviceman who was seriously wounded during the April 2016 hostilities before falling into the hands of Azerbaijani forces. The applicants alleged that, rather than receiving medical assistance, H.T. was tortured, decapitated, and his body was mutilated. They further claimed that parts of his remains were withheld, preventing the family from burying him in full. They also complained that the treatment of H.T. and the authorities’ handling of the case caused them profound mental suffering.
Before addressing the merits, the Court first confirmed that Azerbaijan exercised jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention over H.T. from the moment he came under the control of Azerbaijani forces, notwithstanding that the events occurred during active hostilities outside Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised territory (V.T. and Others v. Azerbaijan, para 43-54).
In assessing the evidence, the Court relied on a wide range of material, including photographs and videos, forensic evidence, reports by international organisations, expert opinions, witness statements, and the parties’ submissions (para 50). On the basis of this evidence, it concluded that H.T. had been alive when he came under the control of Azerbaijani forces and that he was subsequently subjected to torture before being killed. The Court further found that his body had been decapitated while alive and otherwise mutilated after his death (paras 74-77, 85-87).
The Court accordingly held that Azerbaijan had violated Article 2 of the Convention because H.T. had been unlawfully deprived of his life while under the control of Azerbaijani forces. The Court also found a violation of Article 3 in two respects. First, it held that the torture inflicted on H.T. before his death, together with the pre-mortem decapitation and mutilation of his body, constituted treatment contrary to Article 3 (paras 85-88). Secondly, it concluded that the applicants themselves had been subjected to inhuman treatment. The extreme suffering caused by learning of the torture and desecration of their relative, and the inability to recover all of his remains for burial exceeded the inevitable anguish associated with the loss of a family member in armed conflict (paras 91-93).
Having found violations of Articles 2 and 3, the Court considered it unnecessary to examine separately complaints under Articles 8, 13 and 14 (paras 95, 97). It awarded the applicants just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage, together with costs and expenses.
Beyond the individual facts of the case, the judgment is legally significant in its own right. It is the Court’s first merits ruling arising from the April 2016 hostilities, in which it confirms extraterritorial jurisdiction based on physical control over an individual during active hostilities – following the approach developed in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia – reconstructs battlefield events through extensive evidentiary analysis, and finds substantive violations of both Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.
Yet it is the judgment’s timing that gives it broader significance. Delivered amidst ongoing discussions on the withdrawal of interstate proceedings before the ECtHR and other international legal forums, V.T. and Others extends beyond the events of April 2016. The political and diplomatic reactions it immediately generated demonstrate that the judgment has become part of the wider debate on the future of accountability before Strasbourg.
At first glance, this judgment may not appear particularly groundbreaking. The Court itself classified it as a Level 2 (medium importance) case, suggesting that, while it does not establish a major new legal principle, it nevertheless ‘goes beyond merely applying existing case-law’ (HUDOC User manual). Yet the reactions it triggered arguably tell a different story.
Azerbaijan responded publicly and forcefully. Through its Government Agent, it condemned the judgment, summoned the Head of the Council of Europe Office in Baku to formally convey its protest, and publicly indicated that it may pursue further legal or procedural measures. These steps suggest that Azerbaijan viewed the judgment not simply as another adverse judicial decision, but as an institutional matter warranting a formal diplomatic response to the Council of Europe itself. Given the broader and well-documented non-compliance by Azerbaijan and tensions with the Council of Europe institutions in recent years, this reaction forms part of the judgment’s wider political aftermath.
The Armenian Government, by contrast, has remained publicly silent. It has not issued any statement welcoming the judgment or responding to Azerbaijan’s criticism. This silence is notable because Armenia was not merely an observer in the proceedings. It exercised its right to intervene as a third party under Article 36 of the Convention and actively supported the applicants’ factual allegations. The Court refers to Armenia’s submissions throughout its judgment.
Whether intentional or not, the contrast is striking. While Azerbaijan immediately framed the judgment in political and diplomatic terms, Armenia appears to have adopted a strategy of public restraint, leaving discussion of the judgment’s significance largely to the applicants’ representatives and legal commentators. Indeed, the applicants’ lawyers subsequently held a press conference highlighting the judgment’s importance and its broader implications.
At the time of writing, no information is publicly available indicating that either party has requested referral of the case to the Grand Chamber.
Delivered more than ten years after the underlying events, the judgment arrives at a particularly delicate political moment. This naturally raises several questions. Why did the Court decide to deliver this judgment now, while discussions on the withdrawal of interstate litigation are ongoing? Why did it issue a judgment in only one out of the 22 jointly examined cases? Could the political reactions surrounding V.T. influence the timing or handling of the remaining judgments, or even litigation concerning the broader conflict? There are, of course, no definitive answers to these questions. Nevertheless, one conclusion seems difficult to avoid: neither the delivery of this judgment nor its eventual execution is likely to be straightforward for the states concerned.
Although V.T. and Others concerns events arising from the four-day war of 2016, it offers an important illustration of the continued role that individual applications may play in securing accountability. Notably, there has never been an interstate application before the ECtHR – or, indeed, before any other international judicial forum – concerning the April 2016 escalation. Nor do the interstate proceedings initiated after the 2020 hostilities encompass these events. It was the interstate litigation initiated after the 2020 escalation that fundamentally reshaped legal proceedings between Armenia and Azerbaijan before the Strasbourg Court. More recently, the announced intention to withdraw interstate claims has, at least potentially, left many victims uncertain about the future of international judicial protection. In a previous post, I discussed why this development risks creating a significant accountability gap and argued that individual applications may become one of the few-if not the only – remaining legal avenues available to victims on both sides should interstate litigation indeed be withdrawn.
V.T. and Others demonstrates that individual applications are capable of producing authoritative judicial findings concerning torture, inhuman treatment, and unlawful killing. Even in the absence of an interstate case, the Court reconstructed the relevant events, assessed extensive evidence, and established state responsibility under the Convention.
At the same time, the case also highlights the structural limits of relying exclusively on individual litigation to address situations involving widespread or systematic violations. Individual applications are designed to remedy violations suffered by specific applicants, not to comprehensively address mass atrocities affecting thousands of victims. Whether thousands of separate applications can realistically substitute for interstate proceedings remains an open and difficult question.
Moreover, V.T. was not litigated in complete isolation. Armenia’s third-party intervention provided additional factual and contextual submissions that supported the applicants’ case. If Article XV of the agreement were interpreted as preventing such interventions in future cases – as text itself suggests – individual applicants could find themselves litigating against respondent states without comparable institutional support. Whether that interpretation ultimately proves correct remains to be seen, but it illustrates another way in which the procedural landscape for future individual applications may become considerably more challenging.
The judgment in V.T. and Others v. Azerbaijan is unlikely to be remembered solely for its findings on the events of April 2016. Its broader significance lies in the questions it raises about the future of accountability before the Strasbourg Court at a moment when the architecture of interstate litigation appears to be changing.
The judgment demonstrates that individual applications remain a viable mechanism for establishing state responsibility, even in cases arising from armed conflict. At the same time, it exposes the practical and structural limitations of expecting individual litigation to shoulder the burden traditionally carried by interstate proceedings.
Whether V.T. ultimately becomes an isolated judgment or the first of many similar decisions may depend less on its legal reasoning than on developments outside the courtroom: the fate of the remaining pending cases, the implementation of the initialled agreement, and the willingness of both states to preserve meaningful avenues for victims seeking international justice. Until those questions are answered, V.T. and Others stands as both a reminder of what individual applications can achieve – and of what they cannot be expected to accomplish alone.
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