In what is possibly one of the most important judgments of 2016, Paposhvili v. Belgium, the Grand Chamber has memorably reshaped its Article 3 case law on the expulsion of seriously ill migrants. In a unanimous judgment, the Court leaves behind the restrictive application of the high Article 3 threshold set in N. v. the United Kingdom and pushes for a more rigorous assessment of the risk of ill-treatment in these cases. For us at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, it was a thrill to intervene as a third party in such an important case. In our third party intervention we submitted that Paposhvili offered a unique opportunity to depart from the excessively restrictive approach adopted in N. We are delighted that the Grand Chamber has seized the opportunity to re-draw the standards in this area of its case law in a way that does fuller justice to the spirit of Article 3.
By Dirk Voorhoof *
Recently, the Council of Europe Task Force for Freedom of Expression and Media published a book under the title “Journalism at risk. Threats, challenges and perspectives”. Since a Grand Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 20 October 2015, a new threat for journalistic freedom has obviously emerged, that is the risk for journalists to be detained, prosecuted and convicted for disobeying a police order while covering a public demonstration. At least, that is the consequence of the judgment in the case of Pentikäinen v. Finland.
The Grand Chamber concludes that the interference with a press photographer’s right to freedom of expression and newsgathering because of disobeying a police order to leave the scene of a demonstration that had turned into a riot, can be said to have been “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. At an earlier stage in this procedure the Chamber of the fourth section, with five votes to two, had come to the same conclusion (see our blogs in March 2014, here and here).
Few judgments have sparked more criticism than N. v. the United Kingdom. The high Article 3 threshold set in the case of a seriously ill woman expelled to Uganda where she died shortly after her return has been criticized both inside and outside the Court. Following what some considered a missed opportunity in S.J. v. Belgium last March, the Grand Chamber now has a renewed chance to revisit the N. approach in Paposhvili v. Belgium. In a third-party intervention in the case, the Human Rights Center at Ghent University invited the Grand Chamber to reconsider the unduly restrictive approach adopted in N. In this post, I highlight the main points we made in our intervention as well as some of the parties’ Article 3 oral arguments during last week’s hearing.
This guest post was written by Natalija Bitiukova*
Is it possible that having a discriminatory law allowing civil partnerships only for different-sex couples is better than having no law at all? After the Grand Chamber released its judgment in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece case, Lithuanian human rights advocates have realized that indeed it is. Contrary to a popular view that the judgment could become an easy-win for Lithuanian same-sex couples, it seems that the equal right to enter into a civil partnership will have to wait. Unfortunately, the ECtHR, in naming Greece and Lithuania as the only countries which provide for a form of registered partnership designed solely for different-sex couples, has counted them wrongly. Continue reading
On Wednesday, our research team attended the Grand Chamber hearing at the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S.A.S. v. France, in which we submitted a third party intervention on behalf of the Ghent University Human Rights Centre. The case concerns the French law banning the face veil, a highly debated piece of legislation, which was also obvious from the amount of international press covering the hearing. I will first briefly discuss the content of our third-party intervention and then turn to a summary of the hearing which left a positive impression on us.
This guest post was written by Cesare Pitea, Researcher in International Law (Faculty of Law) and Assistant Professor of Interational Law (Faculty of Political Science), University of Parma (Italy).
1. Judging in a Heated Political Context
In the Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) judgment ([GC], no. 126/05, 22 May 2012), the third chapter of the “Scoppola Saga” (See Scoppola v. Italy, no. 50550/06, 10 June 2008 and Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) had the chance of reassessing the issue of prisoners’ deprivation of the right to vote under Art. 3 of Prot. No. 1. Indeed, the 2004 Grand Chamber judgment in Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) ([GC], no. 74025/01, 30 March 2004) on this very same subject had caused an heated debate between defenders of national sovereignty and subsidiarity (see Lord Hoffman’s critical remarks here) and supporters of a more effective and incisive international judicial review by the Court, causing an on-going (see the post by L. Peroni and M. Burbergs) tension between the Court and one of its “founding fathers”, the United Kingdom. Echoes of this controversy have recently been heard in Brighton, where at the High-level conference convened by the British Government, the idea of narrowing the Court’s powers of review – inter alia by introducing the notion of the margin of appreciation in the text of the Convention – was initially flagged (see the UK Draft Brighton Declaration) and finally dropped (see the adopted Brighton Declaration).
When it comes to protecting family life, the Strasbourg Court is torn between realism and formalism. The recent Grand Chamber case of van der Heijden v Netherlands is a good example of this. The Court showed itself to be deeply divided over a question of testimonial privilege – meaning the right not to testify against one’s family member or partner. By 10 votes to 7 (and additionally 3 concurring judges expressing their hesitation), it held that the Dutch State cannot be criticized for limiting testimonial privilege to those who are related by blood and those who have formalized their relationship through marriage or registration.
At first glance this may well seem reasonable, but you might change your mind – as I did – when you hear the facts of this case. In a nutshell: Ms. van der Heijden was kept in detention for 13 days because she refused to comply with an order to testify against her life-partner, with whom she had been cohabiting for 18 years and with whom she has two children. In what follows, I will argue that it is regrettable that the Court departs from a flexible approach that puts people and not legal categories first. Continue reading