G.J. v. Spain and Access to Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking

Guest post by Ruth M. Mestre i Mestre, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia.

The G.J. v. Spain Decision (App. no. 59172/12) shows many of the problems victims of human trafficking encounter to access justice. It is, sadly, one of those cases where formalities swallow justice, since the outcome could have been totally different had the Court considered that the circumstances of the case required examination, in spite of, or precisely because of the failure to comply with the “written authority” requirement of submission (Rule 36.1 and 47(5)(1)(c) of the Rules of Court).

The challenges posed to the Court were interesting from the perspective of analysing the gender aspects of human trafficking and specially for determining whether the procedures for the identification of victims of trafficking that subordinate their protection to cooperation in criminal procedures against traffickers are compatible with the positive obligations arising from article 4 ECHR. The inadmissibility of the application leaves these questions unanswered. My comments will briefly engage with two sets of issues, the missed opportunity with regards to trafficking, and its connection to the substantive inadmissibility decision of the Court.

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F.G. v Sweden: fine-tuning the risk assessment in asylum claims

By Salvo Nicolosi

In the Grand Chamber’s ruling of last 23 March 2016, the Strasbourg judges came back on appeal to the controversial case of F.G. v. Sweden, which on 16 January 2014 had divided the Chamber’s judges as to the assessment of the risk of persecution for an Iranian national who had applied for asylum in Sweden.

In its judgment, the Grand Chamber carves out an obligation for the competent domestic authorities to asses “of their own motion” the risk to the applicant, regardless of whether or not the applicant chooses to rely on some elements in his asylum application, when the rights guaranteed under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR are at stake.

The case offers an interesting opportunity to reflect on a twofold issue concerning: a) the assessment of the risk to the applicant of persecution; b) the meaning of the specific ground for persecution in order for an applicant to apply for asylum. Both aspects will be analysed after a short summary of the relevant facts of the case.

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Migrants’ avoidance of the European Court of Human Rights concerns us all

By Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Professor of Law and Anthropology at the Brighton Business School, University of Brighton (*) This post has been re-published on When Humans Become Migrants Blog.

Every year towards the end of January, the President of the European Court of Human Rights holds a press conference that takes stock of the previous year. This year, President Raimondi reported in his speech that the situation of the Court was ‘generally satisfactory’. Can we be so sure?

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V.M. and Others v. Belgium: The asylum law discourse reloaded

By Salvo Nicolosi

Last 7 July 2015, the Second Section of the Strasbourg Court ruled in V.M. and Others v. Belgium, concerning the violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR owing to the reception conditions of asylum seekers. The case must be placed within the settled case law on the protection of asylum seekers under Article 3 ECHR which the Court has developed over the years and thus it offers another occasion to reflect on the timely and controversial debate regarding the interpretation of the right to asylum through the lens of the Strasbourg Court (Bossuyt, 2010; Mole/Meredith, 2010).

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A.S. v. Switzerland: missed opportunity to explain different degrees of vulnerability in asylum cases

By Salvo Nicolosi and Ruth Delbaere (Ghent University)

In the recent judgment of last 30 June 2015 in A.S. v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights offers another occasion to reflect on the issue of vulnerability in asylum cases.

The ruling represents another episode of the ongoing saga concerning the Dublin System to determine the State responsible for asylum applications and builds upon the previous case law relating to Article 3 considerations when expelling seriously ill persons, on the one hand, and when deporting asylum seekers to another country, pursuant to Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 (now replaced by Dublin III Regulation 604/2013), on the other hand. Both lines of reasoning will be taken into account in the following analysis.

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S.J. v. Belgium: missed opportunity to fairly protect seriously ill migrants facing expulsion

This guest post was written by Sarah Ganty, Ph.D. student at the Institute for European Studies and at the Faculty of Law (Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy) of the ULB within the Research project ARC “Sous le signe du mérite et de la conformité culturelle, les nouvelles politiques d’intégration des immigrés en Europe”. See also the post she wrote for the Blog of the Berkeley Journal of International Law.

On March 19, 2015, the Grand Chamber (GC) of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) struck out of its list the sensitive case of S.J. v. Belgium on the basis of the friendly settlement between the Belgian Government and the applicant, S.J, mother of three children, who suffers from an advanced stage of AIDS and faced expulsion. Indeed, the Belgian Government ultimately regularized the residency status of the applicant and that of her three children, justified by the “strong humanitarian considerations” of their situation.

Why then write this note on a case that was not eventually ruled on the merits by the GC of the Court and where the outcome looks like a “happy ending”? Continue reading

Another episode in the Strasbourg saga on the Dublin System to determine the State Responsible for Asylum Applications

This guest post was written by Salvo Nicolosi, Postdoctoral Researcher at Ghent University’s Human Rights Centre.

The recent decision in A.M.E. v. The Netherlands, issued by the European Court of Human Rights last 13 January 2015 and notified in writing on 5 February 2015, offers another occasion to assess through a human rights perspective the working of the Dublin system for determining which State is responsible for deciding an asylum seeker’s application for international protection.

Based on Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 (now replaced by Dublin III Regulation 604/2013) such system has represented the core of a thriving case law of the Strasbourg Court, including the case under discussion. The analysis will be therefore enhanced by discussing the findings in other two key cases to which the Strasbourg made explicit reference in A.M.E. v. The Netherlands, namely the recent Tarakhel v. Switzerland and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. Continue reading